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Abstract 
A central goal of psychiatric classification is to assist in the assessment and treatment 
of those who experience mental disorder. This challenge takes on greater significance in 
complex cases, especially given the high prevalence of psychiatric comorbidity. High rates of 
comorbidity also challenge the validity of current psychiatric nosology. Etiological 
classification has been promoted as an alternative to improve the state of psychiatric 
diagnosis. However, comorbidity makes specific conceptual, explanatory and methodological 
demands of any such classification strategy. In this thesis, a demand for coherent and 
integrative explanation of comorbidity acts as a standard by which to assess the strength of 
different causal models of mental disorder and their resultant concepts. Integrative pluralism 
is presented as an epistemological framework well-suited to the complexity of this scientific 
challenge.  
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Introduction 
Psychiatric comorbidity presents both challenges and opportunities. For those who 
experience multiple mental disorders, comorbidity acts as a marker of poorer prognosis and 
poorer treatment outcomes. For clinicians and researchers its high prevalence is as an 
indicator that psychiatric nosology could be improved. 
One strategy to improve nosology, and the practice of diagnosis which follows from 
it, is to move to classification based in etiological theory or causal models of mental disorder. 
Causal understanding offers the potential to more effectively intervene for the purpose of 
prevention or treatment of mental disorder. In the spirit of scientific realism, causal 
explanation may also bring concepts of mental disorder closer to reality or the “truth”, thus 
improving the ultimate validity of diagnosis. 
However, mental disorder appears recalcitrant to simple causal explanations and as 
will be argued, the phenomena of comorbidity in particular demands especially high 
explanatory coherence and integration from models of mental disorder. Thus, the nature of 
comorbidity has implications for future nosological strategies.  
It may be that the nature of mental disorder is so causally heterogeneous, not only in 
its causes but in its causal structures, that one disorder cannot be easily discriminated from 
another. In this instance comorbidity would cease to exist as a real phenomenon and hold 
little explanatory value. If this is the case then classification of mental disorders cannot 
proceed on the basis of aetiology and instead may turn to a basis in pragmatism and 
empiricism in order to meet ethical goals. 
Alternatively it may be that the nature of mental disorder is homogeneous enough in 
causal structure to be etiologically discriminable, one disorder from another, and from 
normality. In this case comorbidity would gain explanatory value and classification could 
proceed on an etiological basis in accordance with realist assumptions. Such models could be 
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used to advance the treatment and prevention of comorbid disorder – a particularly important 
goal. 
Of course it is also feasible that mental disorders differ significantly in their causal 
structure, inhabiting different zones along a continuum of structural homogeneity to 
heterogeneity. With this continuum in mind, the concept of comorbidity is put to work to 
assess the resilience of different models of mental disorder to comorbidity’s explanatory 
demands. In this way, implications for future classificatory approaches are considered. 
Chapter One sets out evidence and reasoning for why comorbidity is a phenomenon 
worth consideration and argues for standards of explanation that follow from its ethical 
demands. Chapter Two then reviews the coining of the term comorbidity and the historical 
context of its conceptual development.  Chapter Three discusses several different concepts of 
comorbidity, including comorbidity at the population versus the individual level. Then 
concepts of comorbidity stemming from physical medicine are discussed before critique of 
concepts of mental disorder as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-5th edition 
(DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). Following this, various models of 
mental disorder are explored: latent construct and pathogenetic models are reviewed in 
Chapter Four; Chapter Five presents a pathophysiological model; and in Chapter Six, 
integrative and network models of mental disorder are considered. The thesis concludes with 
a brief summary of implications for classification, causal models, theoretical and 
epistemological strategies, that follow from their examination through the lens of 
comorbidity. 
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Chapter One - Why Comorbidity Has Something Important To Say 
Despite psychiatric comorbidity’s theoretical and methodological significance 
(Bogenschutz & Nurnberg, 2000), its most important consequence is the distress and 
disability it brings to those who experience comorbid mental disorders. It is this concern 
which directs the arguments of this thesis. 
Data from the US National Comorbidity Survey (NCS) indicate that 14% of the 
population have a lifetime history of three or more mental disorders. This group is estimated 
to share more than half of the total population’s prevalence of lifetime mental disorder 
(Kessler et al., 1994). These results were reinforced by findings from the Australian 2007 
National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing (Slade, Johnston, Oakley Browne, Andrews, 
& Whiteford, 2009), where one in four people who met criteria for a 12-month ICD-10 
(International Classification of Diseases, World Health Organization, 1992) diagnosis, were 
also diagnosable with a comorbid disorder.  
Increased severity, disability, distress, recurrence and health burden are all strongly 
related to comorbidity (Andrews, Slade, & Issakidis, 2002; Gadermann, Alonso, Vilagut, 
Zaslavsky, & Kessler, 2012; Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005; Maj, 2005a). The 
National Comorbidity Survey – Replication study (NCS-R) demonstrated that although 
mental disorder is quite prevalent within the community, serious cases occur “among a 
relatively small proportion of cases with high comorbidity” (Kessler et al., 2005, p. 617). 
Evidence also suggests that those who experience serious mental health conditions 
have both inequitable access to physical health services and significantly higher mortality 
rates (Phelan, Stradins, & Morrison, 2001; Prince, Patel, Saxena, Maj, & et al., 2007). This 
may occur for a number of reasons. Comorbidity may reduce participation in treatment, may 
reduce treatment effectiveness or may require additional treatment provision. It may also 
increase the likelihood for an insidious chronic course, with a lower probability of recovery. 
IMPLICATIONS OF COMORBIDITY          4 
 
 
A comprehensive literature review by Fenton, Blyler, and Heinssen (1997) indicated 
that comorbid alcohol and drug abuse was a strong predictor of “noncompliance” with 
pharmaceutical treatment for schizophrenia and an important factor to address when seeking 
to improve treatment adherence. The well-cited STAR*D study evaluated the outcomes of 
citalopram treatment for depression in participants drawn from psychiatric and primary care 
settings. Those with comorbid psychiatric disorders (especially anxiety and drug abuse), as 
well as those with comorbid medical disorders, had reduced rates of remission from 
depression following treatment than those with a single diagnosis (Trivedi et al., 2006).  
A study investigating outcomes from treatment with either antidepressant medication 
or structured psychotherapy in a group of low-income women indicated similarly poorer 
results for those with comorbidity. In this instance, of the full sample who met criteria for 
depression, 33% also met criteria for comorbid post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). While 
treatment with either medication or psychotherapy resulted in improvements of depression 
for both groups, the group with comorbid PTSD experienced more distress and impairment at 
a one year follow up. Although treatment did reduce symptoms of depression in the comorbid 
group, the authors suggested that provision of treatment for PTSD, especially in the context 
of interpersonal violence, may additionally assist in alleviating depression (Green, Krupnick, 
& Chung, 2006). Finally, a 12-year prospective study of participants with anxiety disorders 
including generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), social phobia and panic disorder, also 
demonstrated reduced recovery and higher recurrence with the presence of psychiatric 
comorbidity (Bruce et al., 2005). Here, comorbidity between anxiety disorders and major 
depression or substance abuse, as well as comorbidity within the investigated anxiety 
disorders, acted as a predictor of poorer clinical course. 
In fact, the high incidence of depression as a comorbid disorder, may explain a 
significant portion of the decrease in life satisfaction associated with comorbidity (Meyer, 
IMPLICATIONS OF COMORBIDITY          5 
 
 
Rumpf, Hapke, & John, 2004). 78.5% of those meeting criteria for a 12-month diagnosis of 
major depressive disorder (MDD) were diagnosed with another comorbid disorder, with 
MDD considered primary in only a small proportion of cases (Kessler et al., 2003).  
Explanations for Poorer Outcomes 
Such evidence points to poorer outcomes from a variety of treatments for those who 
experience comorbidity, in a number of different combinations, across a range of disorders.  
Potential reasons for such outcomes include the stigma associated with multiple diagnoses, a 
lack of understanding about the causal interactions that bring about comorbidity, and the use 
of homogeneous or “pure” samples in treatment efficacy research. 
Stigma associated with a mental disorder diagnosis is worse for those who receive 
comorbid diagnoses than those with a single mental disorder diagnosis or chronic physical 
condition. An international study found that this was the case for those with comorbid anxiety 
and mood disorders across both developed and developing countries (Alonso et al., 2008). 
However, while stigma may have some role in explaining why those with comorbidity 
experience poorer outcomes, either with or without treatment, a more important factor is 
likely to be current lack of understanding of how disorders causally interact, and therefore, a 
lack of guidance in treating such complex cases. 
Findings from a substantial meta-analysis of randomised controlled trials (RCT’s) of 
treatment outcome for anxiety disorders, illustrates this well (Olatunji, Cisler, & Tolin, 2010). 
Various types of treatments (cognitive behaviour therapy [CBT], dynamic therapy, 
pharmaceutical treatment with and without CBT, and mindfulness) were included in this 
study. Contrary to expectations based on previous anxiety comorbidity literature (such as the 
findings above by Bruce et al., 2005), higher levels of comorbidity did not necessarily predict 
lower treatment effect. It was found that comorbidity in the context of mixed anxiety had a 
negative relationship with treatment effectiveness, whereas a significant positive treatment 
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effect was observed for overall comorbidity with panic disorder, PTSD and obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD). Here, “overall comorbidity” was any anxiety disorder comorbid 
with any other non-anxiety disorder. Most studies however, excluded schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorders.  
From these findings the authors concluded that such effects may indicate one 
disorder’s causal or symptom dominance over the other comorbid disorder. An alternative 
interpretation is that, given a large portion of RCT’s included in the analysis were CBT 
interventions, and the mechanisms by which CBT brings about change is unclear (Shafran et 
al., 2009), treatment effect may have been relatively non-specific to disorder type. In 
addition, while treatment effect size may have been similar for those with comorbidity, 
resultant well-being itself may still have been generally worse. In any case, “the findings also 
highlight a clear need for additional research examining the nature of the influence of 
comorbidity on treatment outcome of anxiety disorders” (p. 651).  
One area where causal interactions between disorders are slightly less opaque is that 
of “dual diagnosis”. However, even here multiple mechanisms and associations are posited to 
simultaneously drive comorbidity between depression and substance use (Swendsen & 
Merikangas, 2000). A study that investigated the outcomes of integrated and intensive 
treatment for those with severe and chronic alcoholism, found differential associations 
between alcohol use and comorbid psychiatric disorders (Wagner et al., 2004). Whereas 
personality disorder acted as a strong predictor of both treatment drop out and relapse, 
comorbidity with mood and anxiety disorders did not. Additionally, comorbid mood disorders 
remitted more quickly than anxiety disorders with continued abstinence. However, the 
authors emphasised a need to directly address both alcohol use and depression through long-
term, integrated treatment in order for change to be effected in the lives of these individuals. 
Indeed a systematic literature review by Schulte, Meier, and Stirling (2011) indicated that 
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client satisfaction was higher for those dual diagnosis clients who received integrated dual 
diagnosis treatment than for those dual diagnosis clients who received standard treatment 
without an integrated dual focus. 
Thus, it appears a lack of coherent models accounting for the causal relationships 
between disorders is an impediment to the development of integrated care of comorbid 
disorders. Moreover, concepts of what distinguishes one disorder from another in comorbid 
presentations would also be improved if such models existed. Such clarity may serve to 
improve clients’ understanding of the rationale for particular treatment approaches or simply 
focus treatment on factors that will make a bigger functional improvement. 
  For those with severe mental health difficulties (schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and 
severe depressive or anxiety disorders) a focus on collaborative care may be just as 
important. Lee, Crowther, Keating, and Kulkarni (2013) identified consumers’ and carers’ 
engagement in treatment and service decisions as crucial to addressing “comorbidities” such 
as homelessness, addiction, physical illness, unemployment and forensic issues. These 
difficulties frequently form barriers to treatment for severe psychiatric disorders. 
Comorbidities such as homelessness and unemployment also serve as a reminder that causal 
interactions are likely to occur at multiple levels, from biological through to socio-political. 
Such evidence of poorer outcomes for those who experience comorbidity is likely 
related to an inadequate understanding of the causal interactions that bring about mental 
disorder. Additionally, development of effective treatments for those with comorbid disorders 
may be inhibited through the use of homogenous or pure samples in treatment efficacy 
research. More broadly, this issue relates to the applicability of research findings to the clinic 
environment. 
The use of homogenous or pure disorder samples in research has been recognised as a 
problem for the treatment of comorbidity since the term’s inception (Feinstein, 1970). Hyman 
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(2010) cites the DSM’s role in both scientific and regulatory domains as central in 
determining the use of pure samples for drug registration and clinical trials. The concepts of 
disorders as laid down in nosology, therefore, have obvious implications for treatment. 
Maj (2005b) links “unwarranted polypharmacy” with the artificial splitting of clients’ 
holistic presentations into disorder categories (p. 182). A practice of polypharmacy for 
complex cases does indeed seem to be on the rise. While some drug combinations have 
evidential support, “many are of unproven efficacy” (Mojtabai & Olfson, 2010, p. 26). For 
example, polypharmacy for bipolar disorder has increased dramatically despite a lack of 
evidence in support of its effectiveness (Sachs, Peters, Sylvia, & Grunze, 2014). Weinstock et 
al. (2014) reported that in a sample of patients with bipolar disorder presenting for hospital 
admission, 36% met criteria for complex polypharmacy of four or more medications. Those 
who did were more likely to be female, in a depressive state, with a comorbid anxiety 
disorder, and a history of suicide attempt. Use of multiple medications without the backing of 
specific empirical evidence could be based upon two possible beliefs: that the biological 
causes of distress will be addressed with the administration of an additional pharmaceutical 
agent; or in the absence of such a causal presumption, trial and error is an acceptable strategy. 
When faced with a client in serious distress, in the absence of readily available treatment 
guidance that maps well onto a particular presentation, it is understandable that clinicians turn 
to either internally held causal models of mental disorder or their experience of “what’s 
worked in the past”. In either case it is obvious that clearer understanding of the causal 
processes at work would clarify treatment choices. 
In contrast, beliefs that CBT efficacy research is similarly dominated by the use of 
homogeneous samples are arguably unfounded. Shafran et al. (2009) reported that RCT 
efficacy research using comorbid samples has increased in recent times. Additionally, they 
argued that, when clinicians are allowed some flexibility to address comorbidity, RCT results 
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do generalise well to the clinical population. Here, non-specific therapist effects appeared less 
important than improving the delivery of treatment protocols. Yet at the same time, the 
mechanisms for change in CBT treatments remain unclear (Shafran et al., 2009), alongside 
the causal interactions within and between disorders.   
Thus, when it comes to comorbidity, although the research base may be improving, 
much is left to the clinician to decide how treatment proceeds. This appears to be the case 
with either medication or psychotherapy treatment. Knowledge is certainly growing 
regarding general and specific risk factors alongside the effects of mediators and moderators 
of mental disorder. Generic etiological models, such as those by Kendler and Gardner (2011) 
regarding the development of depression in women, help in understanding how specific 
disorders may be caused. However, in order to understand and effectively treat comorbidity, it 
appears that a more detailed understanding is required. There is a need to move beyond 
explanations that operate at the level of “multiple mechanisms of comorbidity are likely to be 
simultaneously active” (Swendsen & Merikangas, 2000, p. 173). This means finding methods 
that identify which particular factors are most active in bringing about a particular client’s 
presentation and referring to theory and evidence that demonstrates how intervention may 
assist. 
These findings clarify an important ethical goal - to improve outcomes for those who 
live with the highest burden of mental health difficulties, the comorbid population. Such a 
goal certainly has implications for broader service delivery as well as clinical practice and 
research objectives. One strategy to meet this goal is to improve the causal understanding of 
mental disorder. Through an understanding of cause and effect we may improve treatment, 
allow more accurate prognosis and intervene to prevent mental disorder. Clear knowledge 
objectives spring from the ethical goal to improve outcomes for those who experience 
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comorbidity. It is these knowledge objectives that form the focus of this thesis, alongside 
their application to the work of clinicians and researchers via classification. 
Ethical Driver Shapes Knowledge Objectives 
Comorbidity’s consistently high prevalence since the introduction of DSM-III (APA, 
1980) indicates that it is not an anomaly. Instead comorbidity demands improvements in our 
concepts, models and classification of mental disorder. At the same time it opens a door into 
the complexity of mental disorder, which in turn suggests that responding to its challenges 
will be no small undertaking. It is towards this complexity that our concepts, theories and 
methods should turn.  
The ethical goal to improve outcomes for those with comorbid disorders consequently 
demands an improvement to the state of scientific knowledge. In particular, this ethical goal 
demands coherent concepts and explanations of comorbidity:  
1. In order for the individual experiencing mental disorder (and those involved in 
their care) to make sense of their experience;  
2. For the development of effective treatments and interventions;  
3. For the clinician to adequately carry out the roles of assessment, communication 
and application of treatment with the client. 
Conceptual and explanatory coherence. 
As will be demonstrated, concepts of comorbidity are intrinsically tied to concepts of 
mental disorder. These concepts relate to what mental disorder is and what it is not; what 
differentiates mental disorders from one another; and what distinguishes mental disorder 
from normality and from more general problems in living. Much literature exists regarding 
concepts of mental disorder (First, 2012; Phillips et al., 2012a; Wakefield, 1992; Zachar & 
Kendler, 2007). Central to the debate is causal explanation. Irrespective of how implicit or 
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undeveloped, causal explanation shapes the concept of mental disorder from which the 
concept of comorbidity follows. 
Arguably the most prominent conceptualisation of mental disorder is Jerome 
Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis (Wakefield, 1992, 2007). Under this concept, 
mental disorder is caused by a failure of a mechanism to fulfil its natural function or evolved 
purpose. Causal models are also prevalent in folk psychology concepts of mental disorder. 
For example the above study by Swendsen and Merikangas (2000) cited the adage “drinking 
to forget” as a common-sense explanation for why alcohol is often used in the context of 
psychological difficulties (p. 185). This thesis examines concepts of comorbidity as a means 
to give insight into current and alternative models of mental disorder. 
As discussed above, causal understanding is important for a number of reasons. It 
helps to make sense of a client’s experience, it increases the likelihood of developing 
effective treatment or intervention, and it presents a rationale to client and clinician for 
particular treatment approaches. It is important to remember however that causal models are 
representations of the world (Sloman, 2005). Their presentation of cause and effect may exist 
at different levels of detail or different granularities. They may be relatively simple or 
encompass multiple causal factors. They may demonstrate a link between cause and effect 
with high certainty or instead model risk associations probabilistically1. They may hold 
across a range of background conditions taking the more absolute form of universal laws. 
Alternatively they may be more conditional upon other factors, as is the case with INUS2 
conditions. Indeed it is these types of complex and conditional causal pathways that seem to 
characterise mental disorder.   
                                                        
1 Statistically generated risk models are included under this and following discussions of 
causal models. 
2 These are conditions where a cause alone is Insufficient to bring about an effect, but is a 
Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient set of conditions that may bring about an 
effect (Meehl, 2001; Sloman, 2005).  
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Just as causal models and explanations may have different features, they may also be 
of varying quality. Drawing on philosophy of science and epidemiological literature, Kendler 
(2012) compiled seven criteria by which to assess an explanation: 
1. Strength – reflects a causal variable’s3 effect size. A strong explanation will 
account for a large amount of the variance observed. 
2. Causal confidence – the certainty with which a causal variable is demonstrated to 
alter the outcome, as opposed to an association through non-causal mechanisms. 
3. Generalizability – the robustness of the causal variable in bringing about an effect 
across a range of background conditions. Strength and generalizability are often 
related. 
4.  Specificity – the extent to which a causal variable is involved in bringing about 
one effect but not another, for example anxiety but not depression. 
5. Manipulability – the ability to manipulate the causal variable in order to change 
the outcome. Indicates the potential for successful treatment. 
6. Proximity – the proximity of the variable in the causal pathway towards the 
outcome. Distal causes do not reflect foundational causes; this is dependent upon 
the nature of the causal chain. 
7. Generativity – the potential for “fruitful etiological understanding” being 
stimulated by this causal variable. (p. 14.) 
Kendler (2012) suggests that unlike some diseases, such as cystic fibrosis, which can 
appeal to solely genetic causes to sufficiently meet all explanatory criteria, mental disorders 
must appeal to multiple factors, across multiple levels in order to be adequately explained. In 
their pursuit to build viable models of mental disorder and comorbidity that hold across 
                                                        
3 These explanatory criteria are applied to singular causal variables, risk factors, constructs, 
broad explanations and models of mental disorder and comorbidity, so the term “causal 
variable” should be interpreted in its broadest form. 
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populations or large samples, researchers may be most interested in criteria such as strength, 
generalizability and generativity. Clinicians instead may prioritise specificity, proximity and 
manipulability, in order to tailor assessment and treatment to clients’ needs. Thus explanatory 
priorities may differ according to the desired goal. 
Particularly important in explanations and models of comorbidity is a need for 
coherence. Within coherence lies a demand for integrative explanation. The above criteria of 
strength and generalizability (Kendler, 2012) somewhat relate to explanatory coherence as an 
expression of consistency between variables and effect. Yet, it is the way in which 
explanations and models interact or hold together that is of particular significance for 
understanding comorbidity. In this instance, the concept of coherence operates at a level one 
step removed from the data, coming to instead characterise the types of relationships and 
properties operating within and between causal models. 
Thagard (1989) frames explanatory coherence as based in the logical properties of 
propositions (in this case causal hypotheses and models), their relation to the data or effects 
they seek to explain, and their relation to other propositions. This means that the propositions 
derived from a theory are logically consistent, exhibit relations of symmetry, and refer to 
causal mechanisms that enable each other and interact to produce relevant phenomena. If an 
etiological classification system is eventually proposed, it needs to demonstrate internal and 
external coherence. In line with Thagard’s principles of coherence (1989), that means that the 
causal hypotheses of mental disorder upon which classification is based, account for the data, 
agree with each other, and fit together or converge to form a consistent explanatory system. 
Thagard states that simplicity is also desirable, in that coherence is weakened with the 
addition of more and more hypotheses. As suggested, it may be the case that some disorders 
have relatively simple causal structures, whereas others are best explained by very complex 
causal models. 
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While coherence is desirable for explanations of individual mental disorders, it is 
especially relevant for comorbidity. This is because comorbidity occurs as either an 
intersection or overlap of mental disorders. Comorbidity also requires its own explanations of 
for example, why depression and substance use so regularly co-occur and what the 
predominant mechanisms might be that bring about this phenomenon. These explanations 
should also cohere with explanations of the individual disorders rather than contradicting 
them.  If mental disorders are conceptualised as causal structures then their explanatory 
frameworks need to similarly intersect or overlap in order to maintain coherence with the 
observed phenomena of comorbidity. 
If this is the case then it is likely that explanations and models will need to be 
explicated at a level of detail that makes apparent the interactions between causal systems or 
causal pathways that bring about comorbidity. The requirement to construct coherent 
explanations makes particular demands when seeking an integrative understanding of 
comorbidity. The granularity required of causal models may differ depending on the nature of 
each disorder and the way that disorders interact.  
Such integrative and coherent explanation may be especially useful in guiding 
treatment choices for both the client and clinician. For example, prioritisation of treatment to 
target the most distressing symptoms may be a useful strategy in some instances of 
comorbidity. In other instances, targeting broader causal factors that underlie multiple 
symptoms may be preferred. Such choices rely on integrative and coherent explanation of 
mental disorder and comorbidity. In short, they require a good enough understanding of a 
causal system that effective treatments may be developed to change an effect, and then 
clinically applied to foster well-being for the client. At this time, we lack such an 
understanding. 
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Methods attuned to the demands of comorbidity. 
The development of coherent, integrative explanations of comorbidity is dependent 
upon research and clinical methods that are attuned to comorbidity’s particular demands.  
Through research, models and concepts of mental disorder may be improved. In the 
spirit of scientific realism, this means that representations may more closely approximate an 
objective “truth” or “reality”.  In the spirit of scientific pragmatism this means that models 
are more responsive to our goals (Zachar, 2014). Neither is mutually exclusive. In either 
instance, if comorbidity is considered an important phenomenon requiring explanation then 
methods need to be adopted that will generate explanations and models for understanding 
comorbid disorders and the kinds of comorbidity that are observed. Research is also required 
that investigates the effectiveness of treatment for more common instances of comorbid 
disorders and different kinds of comorbidity.  
Given the likely complexity of this task, simplification is a viable strategy. As 
discussed, however, a certain level of detail is likely required to gain integrative 
understanding. Group studies and traditional experimental and quasi experimental methods 
that look to deconstruct, if not reduce, causal systems into their component parts are essential 
tools. When dealing with emergent phenomena however, Pennington (2014) suggests that the 
act of reconstruction is just as important. 
Reconstructive methods enable the testing of a reductive model to see whether it 
reproduces the emergent phenomena it seeks to explain. Such methods include neural 
network simulations, analysis of brain functional and structural connectivity (Pennington, 
2014), as well as dynamical network modelling of systems beyond the brain (Barabási, 2011; 
Mitchell, 2009).  
Classification forms an important link between the research base of more general 
models and the clinical practice of applying such models to the individual. While 
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classification attends to conceptual demands, assessment and diagnostic methods that follow 
from classification form the method by which those concepts are applied to the clinical and 
research contexts. These methods need to be responsive to the demands of matching the 
individual client to the group level disorder. 
 As will be argued, the current descriptive classification method attends poorly to 
comorbidity’s ethical demands for improved outcomes, and its knowledge demands for 
coherent, integrative explanation. The DSM’s atheoretical approach does not exclude 
etiological theory; instead it leaves the door open for clinicians to use their own causal 
theories. As a result comorbid presentations are likely conceptualised in a subjective and 
idiosyncratic fashion by clinicians who often work with heavy caseloads under considerable 
time pressure. If classification is able to be grounded in explicit concepts and causal models 
of mental disorder this will offer a basis for explicit concepts and models of comorbidity to 
also be developed. As discussed, conceptual clarity and explanatory coherence would 
therefore assist clinicians with assessment, communication and treatment planning. 
As regards the pursuit of classification, comorbidity poses a significant additional 
question – is mental disorder so inherently heterogeneous that it cannot be adequately 
classified, except perhaps on a largely pragmatic basis? Alternatively, is currently observed 
comorbidity an outcome of a poor classification system, which can be rectified with a more 
robust etiological framework? This dialogue is also explored in the coming chapters.  
Chapter Two reviews a history of comorbidity and sets the scene within which current 
concepts of comorbidity were developed. These concepts are explored in Chapter Three. 
Alternative and potential future models of mental disorder are then discussed in following 
chapters, in light of the ethical goals and knowledge objectives identified in this first chapter. 
A short conclusion summarises the findings and proposes suggestions for future 
consideration.   
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Chapter Two - The Creation of Psychiatric Comorbidity  
First Use of the Term Comorbidity 
The term comorbidity was coined with regard to internal medicine in an article by 
Feinstein (1970) entitled “The pre-therapeutic classification of co-morbidity in chronic 
disease.” Here comorbidity was defined as “… any distinct additional clinical entity that has 
existed or that may occur during the clinical course of a patient who has the index disease 
under study” (p. 457). Feinstein used lung cancer as an example of an index disease that 
might exist alongside comorbid coronary artery disease or pneumonia. Written 45 years ago, 
this article voices issues of continued relevance to psychiatric comorbidity: the importance of 
understanding comorbidity at both individual and population levels; the difficulty of 
attributing cause in complex comorbid cases; and the implications of comorbidity for the 
application of research to the clinical context.  
In outlining the functional effects of comorbidity for the patient, such as potential 
earlier detection, increased symptom severity and likely poorer prognosis, Feinstein 
emphasised the impact that comorbidity may have on an individual’s life experience. He also 
noted possible therapeutic implications such as the withholding of intervention due to a 
comorbid condition, and post-therapeutic outcomes such as an inability to work due to the 
comorbid condition. He highlighted some of the diagnostic challenges for the clinician when 
encountering comorbidity in a patient. Here, as in much internal medicine, diagnosis and 
cause are assumed to be inextricably linked through the identification of a pathological 
disease process. Feinstein argued that ascertaining cause in the context of chronic diseases 
was particularly challenging as patients tended to present with a diverse array of symptoms 
and signs, in addition to variation in the sequence and timing of such symptoms. He called for 
both clinical reasoning and statistical research to play a role in decisions regarding treatment 
of patients with comorbid diseases. Thus a particular emphasis was placed on the importance 
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of identifying comorbidity for the purpose of creating comparable groups in order to 
investigate treatment efficacy. Questioning the relevance of research using ‘pure’ samples to 
the clinical care of those with comorbid diseases, he said: 
By excluding patients with associated diseases from trials of therapy for a particular 
disease, statisticians can design the trial to contain a presumably ‘homogenous’ 
population, but the results achieved in these ‘purified’ circumstances cannot be 
extrapolated to the heterogeneous world of clinical reality. (Feinstein, 1970, p. 456) 
Kaplan and Feinstein (1974) later suggested a system by which to classify different 
types of comorbidity, differentiating diagnostic, prognostic and pathogenic comorbidity. 
Diagnostic comorbidity captured the challenge of distinguishing between diseases that shared 
common symptoms, prognostic comorbidity conferred increased risk of adverse future events 
due to the presence of a comorbid disease or the combination of the two diseases, and 
pathogenic comorbidity signified a likely causal relationship existing between the two 
diseases. 
These seminal articles provided a basis by which to consider comorbidity as it related 
to psychopathology. They set the stage for psychiatric comorbidity having significant “real-
life” effects for patients as well as practice implications for the clinician. This discussion also 
highlighted the challenge that comorbidity poses for the application of homogenous group 
research to the individual within a clinical setting. In addition, while it was acknowledged 
that overlapping symptoms and complex chronology characterised comorbid presentations, 
the term was explicitly conceptualised as two or more co-occurring but distinct disease 
processes. 
Development of the DSM-III 
Throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s the validity of psychiatric nosology and diagnosis 
was increasingly questioned (Brown & Barlow, 1992; First, 2012; Klerman, 1990; Rosenhan, 
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1973; Szasz, 1960). This included challenges to the ideological dominance of the medical 
model in relation to psychiatry. Such accounts emphasised the adverse consequences of 
psychiatric diagnosis such as labelling and dehumanisation, questioned the extended reach of 
mental health practice beyond psychopathology into problems in living, and cited a growing 
evidence base from the psychological domain for the validity of dimensional models of 
psychological functioning (Brown & Barlow, 1992; Klerman, 1990).  Furthermore, growing 
evidence from within the psychiatric domain dating back to the 1930’s indicated that 
psychiatric diagnostic practices were variant between clinicians, and thus unreliable (First, 
2012). The most influential of studies was that of Kendell et al. (1971), commonly referred to 
as the “US-UK study”. Using videotaped cases, the study demonstrated that the 
conceptualisations of schizophrenia, manic-depressive illness and personality disorder varied 
significantly between British and American psychologists, and thus so too did diagnosis of 
these disorders.  
Robins and Guze (1970) proposed criteria that if met, would reliably and validly 
diagnose schizophrenia. This laid a theoretical pathway for the paradigm shift that was to 
come. Improving diagnostic reliability was a high priority for good reason; validity is 
unattainable without reliable measurement (Spitzer & Fleiss, 1974). Furthermore, the 
adoption of Cohen’s kappa technique marked a statistical development that enabled the 
quantitative ascertainment of inter-clinician agreement (Spitzer, Cohen, & Fleiss, 1967). 
Reliability was also a direct concern in and of itself, given evidence of discrepant 
conceptualisations and diagnostic practice.  
It was within this context that the DSM-III was developed and later published (APA, 
1980). This publication formalised a paradigm shift in psychiatric classification that had been 
gaining momentum over the previous decade. While it carried from its preceding editions a 
primary goal of clinical usefulness, it departed from the DSM-II (APA, 1968) in a number of 
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important ways: the use of operationalised diagnostic criteria; the promotion of an 
atheoretical descriptive approach; and the inclusion of a biopsychosocial perspective in the 
form of multi-axial diagnosis (First, 2012). 
The groundwork and evidence base for a shift to operationalised diagnostic criteria 
had been successfully laid down within the research domain during the 1970’s, and with it, 
the promise of improved reliability. In particular the discovery of medications such as 
chlorpromazine, lithium and imipramine warranted the need for clear diagnostic criteria, in 
order to assemble homogenous samples for research into the efficacy of these pharmaceutical 
treatments for different clinical presentations (First, 2012). In 1972 the “Feighner criteria” 
were published outlining criteria for 15 psychiatric illnesses, with supporting evidence from 
clinical, family and follow up studies (Feighner et al., 1972). The intention of the Feighner 
criteria was to provide a framework to facilitate communication between researchers and 
allow comparison of findings across research studies. The criteria were presented as tentative 
and open to change in light of new evidence. From the outset, this framed classification and 
nosology as a scientific pursuit founded in iterative improvement.  These diagnostic sets were 
then revised and a further ten disorders added during the development of the Research 
Diagnostic Criteria (RDC, Spitzer, Endicott & Robbins, 1975). These criteria sets formed the 
basis of the operationalised diagnoses subsequently published in the DSM-III in 1980. Field 
trials of the criteria sets indicated their viability for use in clinical settings and improved 
reliability in comparison to DSM-II diagnoses (Spitzer, Forman, & Nee, 1979). 
The second conceptual change brought about by the DSM-III was a move away from 
the psychodynamic explanations that formed the basis of earlier editions, to an atheoretical 
descriptive approach. First (2012) describes Spitzer’s motivation for this politically 
unpopular move as being primarily grounded in a wish to avoid endorsing explanations that 
lacked evidence, rather than a desire to avoid etiologically based classification per se. 
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Another benefit of the descriptive stance however, allowed adoption of the DSM-III for use 
by practitioners from a range of different theoretical perspectives including psychiatrists, 
psychologists and psychoanalysts (APA, 1980). This again reflected the broadening social 
and scientific context in which psychiatric classification was resident. Similarly, the inclusion 
of a multiaxial diagnosis allowed the DSM-III to adopt a biopsychosocial approach. Although 
the manual recommended the evaluation of physical, psychosocial and adaptive functioning 
for the purpose of treatment planning and prognosis, First (2012) argued that it was also 
included to counter arguments that evaluation was a solely diagnostic enterprise. “Thus, the 
decision to include a multiaxial system was as much about reacting to criticism as it was 
about innovation” (p. 135). 
The resulting success of the DSM-III and its adoption as a foundational text for 
clinical, research, educational and public health purposes speaks to its many strengths. Its 
operationalised approach and use of the relatively new kappa technique signalled an 
innovative change. In addition, decisions were founded upon a substantial research evidence 
base in conjunction with field trials that demonstrated clinical feasibility. It reliably improved 
distinction between diagnostic categories and enabled a stronger basis for researching 
treatment efficacy and applying this knowledge to the clinical context. It improved inter-rater 
reliability, allowing for more valid psychiatric diagnosis while enabling better comparison 
across research studies. It also avoided endorsement of etiological theories that lacked 
supporting evidence. Crucially, it added legitimacy to psychiatric classification and diagnosis 
in the face of the substantial challenges detailed earlier. At the same time, it acknowledged its 
fallibility, stating that although data-driven, the interpretations of those on the committees 
were influential in shaping the text (APA, 1980). Furthermore, the original Feighner criteria 
which had played an important role in the inception of operationalising diagnostic criteria, 
was founded upon a realisation that iterative improvement would be made with accumulation 
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of evidence and knowledge (Feighner et al., 1972). The problem of reification however was 
perhaps an unforeseen consequence.  
The Problem of Reification 
In its success the DSM-III became perhaps too influential. The priority to increase 
reliability was coupled with an intention to create a shared language for communication about 
mental disorder. However, this language came to dominate concepts of mental disorders 
within clinical, research and public health settings. Despite the caveat in its introduction that 
diagnostic categories were not intended to specify discrete entities, these categories 
nonetheless became reified (Clegg, 2012; Jacobs & Cohen, 2012; Widiger & Shea, 1991). 
This reification remained a problem for the following editions of the DSM. Hyman (2010) 
described reification as a problem affecting a range of users including those within clinical, 
scientific, legal and other non-clinical communities: “…cautionary statements within the 
DSM-IV (APA, 1994), if read at all, provide little protection among many communities of 
users against reification of the disorders listed within” (p. 158). 
Reification in this instance can be understood as a process in which mental constructs, 
such as the descriptive diagnostic categories outlined in DSM-III and following editions, are 
considered objectively real (Murphy, 2006). Gannon (1984) argued that this process of 
reification focused clinicians’ attention to the diagnostic category rather than the behavioural 
components of an individual’s presentation, leading to an increased risk of dehumanisation 
through diagnosis. Similarly, Jablensky (1991) called for clinicians to employ a “middle 
ground” perspective that optimised the rigour of operationalised criteria while maintaining a 
person-centric approach. In doing so he implored the avoidance of reification in favour of 
“epistemological openness.” 
Reification was likely supported by the following factors: concepts and beliefs 
regarding the nature of mental disorder founded in the medical model; essentialist cognitive 
IMPLICATIONS OF COMORBIDITY          23 
 
 
biases; and a tautological relationship between the nomenclature and research methods for 
group selection. 
Concepts of mental disorder prevalent within the medical model. 
Successes in the latter half of 19th century medicine identified autopsy and 
bacteriological correlates with mental syndromes such as Alzheimer’s disease and syphilis, 
leading to an assumed underlying biological cause for the psychotic disorders among others. 
This causal assumption served as the basis for treatments such as insulin coma and 
electroconvulsive therapy. However, following World War II many psychiatrists found 
success in the use of psychodynamic principles to explain and treat war-related trauma. The 
medical model, with its conceptualisation of mental disorder as discrete categories originating 
from biological cause, was questioned. Although both DSM-I (APA, 1952) and DSM-II 
documents were organised in a hierarchical manner according to medical model classification 
practice, a psychodynamic undertone prevailed regarding many non-organic disorder 
descriptions, with explanations founded in psychopathology as a reaction to the environment 
rather than an outcome of biological properties. Increased interest in mental health from the 
social sciences also broadened perspectives relating to concepts of mental disorder, and 
alongside this, other professions such as clinical psychologists and psychiatric social workers 
began working with those experiencing mental illness (Brown & Barlow, 1992; Clegg, 2012; 
Klerman, 1990). 
Interest in psychiatric classification was revitalised in the 1970’s in response to the 
challenges facing psychiatry as described earlier, leading to the eventual publication of the 
DSM-III. Those involved in the Feighner criteria (Feighner et al., 1972) and RDC (Spitzer, 
Endicott, & Robbins, 1975), among others, were dubbed “neo-Kraepelinians.” Emil 
Kraepelin (1826 – 1926) prioritised description of signs, symptoms and developmental course 
in his classification protocols. It is argued that alongside an explicit desire to improve 
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diagnosis through reliable classification based in evidence, the neo-Kraepelinians also 
emphasised eventual biological explanation of mental disorder (Brown & Barlow, 1992; 
Jacobs & Cohen, 2012; Klerman, 1990). Guze (1982) planted mental disorder firmly within 
the medical domain, naming epidemiology alongside neurobiology as the two realms in 
which scientific progress would be made within the field of psychiatry. He stated that 
“psychiatry wants to reidentify with its medical base, by committing itself anew to that 
quintessential medical activity: diagnosing illness” (Guze, 1982, p. 7). While others have 
more recently argued that the medical model shares much in common with the 
biopsychosocial model (Murphy, 2006), the prioritisation of biological cause as the principle 
explanatory device and level of choice for intervention was evident in other ways. First 
(2012) for example, points to the failure of the multiaxial system, surely the DSM-III’s 
strongest indicator of alignment with broader psychosocial principles, as being due to its low 
clinical utility. A complementary explanation may be that if the cause of mental disorder is 
understood to be biological and the prescribed treatment consequentially addresses that level 
of explanation, then the benefit of measuring functioning in other domains of life is relatively 
limited.  
Whether the explanation of a mental disorder is analogous to discrete categories, such 
as bacterial disease, or more multifactorial chronic illness, such as hypertension, 
conceptualisation of mental disorder within the medical model leant itself to the reification of 
diagnostic categories. The dominant part these categories played in implicitly shaping 
cognitive and socially shared concepts of mental disorder, likely overshadowed explicit 
knowledge of the descriptive status of DSM-III diagnostic constructs, its atheoretical stance, 
and the accompanying disclaimers that reminded users that diagnostic categories were not 
discrete entities (Hyman, 2010). 
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Psychological essentialism. 
Along these lines, Peter Zachar (2000, 2014) highlighted the role of an essentialist 
bias in the reification of psychiatric disorders. Eloquently described by Gelman (2004), 
psychological essentialism can be understood as “the view that certain categories have an 
underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an object its 
identity, and is responsible for other similarities that category members share” (p. 404). 
Within the medical model there is a tendency to view mental disorders as “natural 
kinds” or “essences” (Hyman, 2010; Kendell & Jablensky, 2003; Zachar, 2000). These are 
entities with fixed internal properties that are both necessary and sufficient to define their 
membership to the category of natural kind or essence (Kendler, Zachar, & Craver, 2011; 
Zachar, 2000). Examples of natural kinds often come from physics and chemistry, such as 
elements of the periodic table: all gold atoms have 79 protons and all atoms with 79 protons 
are gold atoms.  Within the medical model, natural kind assumptions dominated, especially in 
the form of “disease realism”. Here diseases are construed as internal biological explanations 
for observed syndromes that are considered objective departures from adaptive functioning 
(Kendell & Jablensky, 2003). Zachar (2000) argued that diseases are not natural kinds, citing 
tuberculosis as an example where the effects of the bacterium in its host is dependent upon 
many factors, making the outcomes relational rather than inherent to the properties of the 
bacterium. Although knowledge of a disease’s causal mechanisms often gives diagnosis high 
predictive validity and reliability, it does not make it a natural kind. A mechanistic biological 
explanation, despite its power and stability, does not entirely discount relational properties 
external to itself. It is important to recognise that Zachar’s concerns regarding natural kinds 
exist outside the debate regarding reductionism of mental states. Instead, Zachar highlighted 
the extent to which our concepts of mental disorders simplify their properties and underlying 
causal explanations due to a cognitive bias towards essentialism. Zachar also similarly 
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critiqued tendencies to regard psychological constructs, such as traits or syndromes, as 
natural kinds. Thus, he regarded psychiatric diagnoses as frequently falling foul to 
representational, causal and placeholder essentialist biases.  
Representational essentialism refers to how categories of human construction, such as 
race, are often construed as accurate reflections of natural kinds. Causal essentialism denotes 
a tendency to view causal relationships or mechanisms that result in category-typical, 
observable characteristics, as natural kinds. Placeholder essentialism indicates a belief that a 
causal essence underlies observable characteristics, and therefore category membership, in 
the absence of knowledge of the actual causal process. Substantial evidence suggests 
essentialism is a cognitive heuristic that acts in quite fundamental ways from at least pre-
school age, assisting in the learning and generalisation of language and knowledge, as well as 
supporting reasoning about internal properties and cause. It appears particularly relevant as a 
reasoning heuristic regarding acquisition of scientific knowledge (Gelman, 2004).  
This evidence also supports the notion that psychological essentialism likely played a 
role in the reification of DSM-III diagnoses. Psychiatric disorders, although based on the best 
evidence available, were descriptive categories constructed through agreement by committee. 
Nonetheless, disorders such as depression and schizophrenia were reified and interpreted as 
categories that objectively existed in reality.  In the context of the medical model, biological 
causes were readily generated based on twin studies that portrayed the role of genetic factors 
as pivotal in the development of these highly specified disorders (Kendler, 1996). Thus, 
although the DSM-III emphasised its descriptive, atheoretical stance, its actual use within the 
broader research and clinical context meant the nosology was readily coupled with nascent 
causal theories and hope of full mechanistic explanation in due course. The representational, 
causal and placeholder cognitive biases of psychological essentialism appear actively at work 
in the oft-bemoaned process of psychiatric diagnosis reification.  
IMPLICATIONS OF COMORBIDITY          27 
 
 
The reciprocal influence of research method. 
A final factor in the reification of diagnostic categories is the tautological relationship 
between classification and research methods. Some methods require the use of comparable 
groups to test hypotheses. Clear definition of criteria used to determine group selection is also 
required when comparing findings across different studies. Diagnostic criteria as outlined in 
classification systems such as the DSM, provides much needed guidance and enables sample 
consistency between different research programmes. Structured diagnostic interviews provide 
even greater consistency and assurance that other sources of sampling error such as 
interviewer bias, is minimised. However, diagnostic criteria need not be the sole or dominant 
determinant of group selection. Indeed research that extends to include participants with 
characteristics beyond diagnostic criteria boundaries is necessary to expand understanding of 
the limitations and weaknesses of classification systems. 
Kendell and Jablensky (2003) addressed the implications of diagnostic criteria on 
research in their classic paper regarding the validity and utility of psychiatric diagnoses. They 
again applauded the improved reliability that DSM-III allowed research, identifying that its 
level of accurate description also facilitated replication studies. However, they questioned its 
eventual use, especially by grant-giving agencies and scientific journals, for pressuring 
researchers to define their participants using the descriptive diagnostic criteria of the DSM 
system. Such policies were particularly dangerous for etiological research, especially if the 
validity of syndromes was questionable. Kendell and Jablensky went so far as to suggest that 
political considerations were overriding scientific interests: 
The widespread use of a single definition has many advantages, but researchers must 
be free to use other definitions if they wish, if only because that is how the 
shortcomings of the standard definition are most likely to be overcome. (2003, p.10) 
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Hyman (2010) also argued that DSM classification had too much influence over the 
work of scientific and regulatory bodies. He cited an example where investigation into 
treatments for the negative symptoms of schizophrenia was stymied due to exclusion of 
cognitive symptoms from the DSM-IV definition of schizophrenia. The extensive use of 
homogeneous samples in research and clinical trials not only inadvertently reinforced DSM’s 
concepts and categories, but potentially impeded treatment development, thus negatively 
impacting on the lives of those it intended to improve.  
Reification summary. 
The process of reification, or construal of diagnostic constructs as objectively real, 
was encouraged by mechanisms of social, cognitive and methodological origin. These 
included conceptualisations of mental disorders within the medical model as being natural 
kinds, likely due to underlying biological processes that in time would be identified, 
confirming the validity of diagnostic categories. Such conceptualisations and understandings 
were supported by psychological essentialism; a bias that evidence suggests is in operation at 
a fundamental cognitive level in both children and adults. Reification of DSM diagnoses was 
also reinforced by the wide publication and funding of research that recruited participants 
based on diagnostic criteria. Research involving pure disorder samples was likely quite 
effective in reinforcing reified diagnostic categories. How the publication of the DSM-III and 
its accompanying reification affected the concept of comorbidity is discussed next.  
The Creation of Psychiatric Comorbidity 
With the uptake of DSM-III in both clinical and research domains it became apparent 
many individuals met criteria for multiple disorders.  This was a problem the multiaxial 
approach only partially addressed. Within the context of the genesis of DSM-III and its 
revision, the concept of comorbidity worked its way into psychiatry and psychology from the 
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medical and epidemiological literature (Klerman, 1990) and became a concept central to 
debates regarding psychiatric diagnosis from the mid 1980’s onwards. 
Within clinical settings the diversity and prevalence of comorbidity became evident 
(Barlow, DiNardo, Vermilyea, Vermilyea, & Blanchard, 1986; Mezzich, Ahn, Fabrega, & 
Pilkonis, 1990) and continued to be so (Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 
2001). However, clinical samples are unlikely to provide the best estimates of comorbidity 
prevalence. Often called Berksonian or clinical ascertainment bias (Berkson, 1946; 
Bogenschutz & Nurnberg, 2000), it has been well established that those who have two or 
more disorders are more likely to present for treatment, and therefore the use of clinical 
populations to calculate prevalence can often overestimate comorbidity in comparison to 
community population data.  
Nonetheless, a number of large-scale epidemiological studies confirmed that 
psychiatric disorders co-occurred at rates that were higher than expected by chance, that is, 
higher than expected given the base rate occurrence of a disorder in its pure form within the 
community. Epidemiological data also highlighted a general tendency toward psychiatric 
comorbidity: diagnosis with any one disorder increased the likelihood of receiving a 
diagnosis for almost any other disorder (Boyd et al., 1984; Regier, Burke, & Burke, 1990). 
Later research utilising DSM-IV criteria, such as the National Comorbidity Survey (NCS), 
replicated these findings of high comorbidity across diagnostic categories (Kessler et al., 
1994). So too did the National Comorbidity Survey Replication study (NCS-R), which 
estimated that 22% of the population meet criteria for two diagnoses, and 23% for three or 
more diagnoses (Kessler et al., 2005). 
The effects of the DSM-III on the incidence and concept of psychiatric comorbidity 
were both direct and indirect. The change from DSM-II to this descriptive, categorical and 
atheoretical classification system significantly increased the incidence of comorbidity 
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(Frances, Widiger, & Fyer, 1990), again bringing to light an issue that challenged the validity 
of psychiatric nosology, but this time from within. Despite this challenge, to a certain extent 
the reification that accompanied the concept of mental disorders, also accompanied the 
concept of comorbidity. 
Direct effects of the DSM-III on comorbidity. 
Frances, Widiger and Fyer (1990) laid out nine ways in which the DSM-III and DSM-
III-R increased the likelihood of comorbidity, a number of which are relevant to this 
discussion. Some of their critiques resonated with earlier criticisms regarding the validity of 
psychiatric diagnosis. They reported that increased coverage in the DSM-III had extended 
psychiatry’s scope of practice. They also suggested that categorical classification could 
artifactually create comorbidity where none existed if the phenomena were actually 
dimensional in structure. In addition, they stated that splitting broadly defined categories into 
more finely-grained diagnostic groups also increased the rate of comorbid diagnoses. 
Importantly their analysis also revealed that changes in diagnostic method accounted 
for much of the observed increase in rates of comorbidity. The diagnosis of multiple disorders 
if different conditions presented together was encouraged in the DSM-III and DSM-III-R, 
leading to less emphasis on differential diagnosis. This led to increased comorbidity, 
especially in instances of co-occurring conditions on different axes such as depression and 
personality disorder. The decision to remove a number of exclusionary criteria in DSM-III-R, 
although based on reasonable grounds, also led to increased comorbidity. So too did the 
lowering of thresholds in DSM-III regarding duration, impairment, severity and frequency of 
symptoms. Decisions regarding level of impairment also became vastly more complicated in 
the case of comorbid diagnoses where it was often unclear whether one disorder caused more 
distress than another, or whether the combined constellation of symptoms was responsible.  
Overlap between criteria items in different diagnostic sets also increased comorbidity, but 
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Frances et al. (1990) pointed out that “if the constructs of anxiety and depression overlap, 
then perhaps the criteria sets should as well” (p. 48).  
Frances et al. (1990) remained cognisant of the pragmatic choices involved in 
designing classification systems, emphasising that while certain decisions may have been 
responsible for increasing comorbidity, they were made to offset other undesired effects or 
assumptions. For example, they acknowledged that while a multiaxial system reduced the 
attention given by the clinician or researcher to differential diagnosis, it also allowed for a 
more complete descriptive picture of the individual, which may benefit both clinical practice 
and research. In the case of anxiety and affective disorders they suggested that dimensional 
measures may be more informative with nominal cut-off points to be utilised only when 
homogenous samples were required for research. 
In summary, their analysis revealed a number of issues that flowed directly from the 
classification system into diagnostic practice. This led, for better or worse, to an increase in 
rates of comorbidity. The concept of psychiatric comorbidity thus took shape as a result of the 
appearance and use of DSM-III. Some of the implicit assumptions underlying concepts of 
mental disorder that were associated with the classificatory change also accompanied the 
concept of comorbidity.  
Reification of comorbidity. 
While comorbidity served as a reminder that improvements in validity had not 
necessarily accompanied gains in reliability, it somewhat ironically, also became an entity 
unto itself. To an extent, the concept of comorbidity was also reified alongside the diagnostic 
categories that were at least in part responsible for its creation (Lilienfeld, Waldman, & Israel, 
1994). Comorbidity in accordance with DSM nosology, referred to “the assignment of more 
than one diagnosis to an individual to account for symptoms of illness occurring during a 
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given period of time” (First, Spitzer, & Williams, 1990, p. 83). As such, it was in all regards a 
construct that again became associated with an objective reality.  
Assumptions inherent in the medical model, regarding causes of comorbidity, were 
carried across to the fields of psychiatry and psychopathology with the adoption of the term 
from general medicine. Whether highly comorbid conditions, such as depression and 
generalised anxiety disorder were considered a natural kind is up for debate, but the influence 
of the medical, disease-driven model is evident in the following examples. 
Even in the most recent DSM-5 (APA, 2013) some disorders are considered dominant 
to others. For example the symptoms of major depression may be better explained by 
schizoaffective disorder or schizophrenia. The hierarchy of disorders evident in the structure 
of the nosology follows a long tradition of hierarchical organisation within medical and 
biological classification (Klerman, 1990), which has given some diagnoses such as organic 
and psychotic disorders, explanatory dominance over others such as anxiety and mood 
disorders. 
While evidence for shared genetic factors between highly comorbid disorders exists 
(Kendler, 1996), beliefs inherent within the medical model about the fundamental influence 
of biological cause has prioritised biological explanations over other possible causes such as 
environmental factors. In particular, the conceptualisation of depression as a biologically-
based disease became well-entrenched, particularly with the availability of moderately 
efficacious pharmacological treatment (Coppen, Shaw & Farrell, 1963). Given that 
depression presented as highly comorbid with a number of other disorders (Mezzich et al., 
1990), this may have contributed to the reification of comorbid diagnoses as co-occurring 
disease processes. 
More recently, comorbidity has been construed as an indicator of phenotypic 
heterogeneity. Here comorbid diagnoses are interpreted as spurious (Bogenschutz & 
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Nurnberg, 2000). Instead a gene or group of genes are understood to be the fundamental 
cause of a range of phenotypic expressions, including comorbid presentations. While it may 
be acknowledged that environmental factors mediate phenotypic outcome, they appear to be 
of less explanatory importance. In contrast, an alternative interpretation consistent with a 
biopsychosocial medical model, is that both biological and environmental factors are causal, 
with not one level of explanation claiming fundamental importance (Kendler, 2012; Murphy, 
2006). 
An example like this illustrates how essentialist biases might impact on interpretations 
of comorbidity. Representational essentialism may lead to the reification of either comorbid 
diagnoses in general, or specific comorbid combinations. Causal essentialism may encourage 
existing evidence of shared genetic or biological factors to be interpreted as dominant 
explanations for comorbid presentations. Finally, placeholder essentialism may support a 
belief that one day etiological classification based in an understanding of biological processes 
such as genetics or neuro-circuitry will lead to the elimination or significant reduction of 
comorbidity.  
Already, a number of concepts of comorbidity have surfaced in this discussion. These 
include: comorbidity as two distinct disease processes; comorbidity as due to a shared 
fundamental cause; comorbidity as a marker of vulnerability; comorbidity as an indicator of a 
specific treatment approach; comorbidity as a challenge to the validity of psychiatric 
diagnosis; comorbidity as a concept created by the DSM-III and its progeny; and comorbidity 
as a signifier of multicausal complexity.  
These concepts are often opposing, and if not, certainly lack consensus and clarity. 
The following chapter will investigate the most influential contemporary concepts of 
comorbidity, and unwrap how each is based within a differing concept of mental disorder. For 
the moment it is important to acknowledge that notwithstanding this disagreement and 
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confusion, neither the DSM-IV nor DSM-5, despite self-acclaimed goals of clinical utility, 
attempt to offer guidance regarding interpreting or working with the concept of comorbidity 
in the clinical setting. While the nosology stands silently by, the outcome for those who meet 
criteria for multiple disorders is an accumulation of separate diagnoses that neglect to 
integrate their symptoms into a meaningful whole and do little to help make sense of their 
singular life experience. 
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Chapter Three - Concepts of Comorbidity 
Introduction 
Comorbidity’s multiple meanings reflects both the variety of professions engaged in 
mental health care and the complexities of conceptualising mental disorder. Even within 
disciplines, concepts may differ across settings. A comorbid diagnosis of depressive and 
substance use disorders may have different meanings for those who regularly encounter it in 
emergency and detoxification settings versus practitioners working with those whose 
conditions are stabilised but chronic (Piotrowski, 2007).  
Given the scope of this thesis, psychiatric and psychological contributions are the 
primary perspectives explored. A choice to exclude social or constructivist perspectives of 
comorbidity was made due to limited space rather than judgment that these approaches lack 
validity. Even within only these fields, concepts of comorbidity can be wide and varied, 
which can decrease clarity. Krueger and Markon (2006) concur, stating that “the problem is 
that the term itself is broad enough to encompass too many conceptually distinct phenomena” 
(p. 4). This represents both a challenge and an opportunity to make the underlying 
assumptions of various conceptualisations of psychiatric comorbidity explicit. This chapter 
and the following chapters are an attempt to utilise distilled conceptualisations of comorbidity 
to appraise different models of mental disorder. However, before investigating models of 
mental disorder a conceptual crossroads is visited, that of comorbidity at the individual versus 
population level. 
Individual Versus Population Conceptualisations 
The term comorbidity has distinct meanings at the population and individual levels, 
raising important challenges and implications. For example, Lilienfeld et al. (1994) suggested 
that comorbidity as a term should be separately referred to as co-variation at the population 
level, and co-occurrence at the individual level. To review, covariance of disorders is the 
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tendency for some disorders to occur together within a population at a higher rate than 
predicted by the product of the base rates of the individual disorders. It is this pattern of co-
variation that may be interpreted as indicative of a vulnerable population or as a nosological 
flaw. 
Comorbidity as an indicator of vulnerable or multimorbid populations. 
High comorbidity of physical conditions and diseases in populations of older persons 
has a range of implications across clinical, epidemiological and public health contexts 
(Pincus, Tew Jr, & First, 2004; van den Akker, Buntinx, & Knottnerus, 1996). This instance 
of high comorbidity or multimorbidity, supports the notion of a vulnerable population of 
older persons. Similar examples include the very young or immunosuppressed. Evidence of 
disproportionately high comorbidity of psychiatric disorders within a relatively small 
percentage of people, may indicate a similarly vulnerable population (Zachar, 2009). 
Epidemiological research supports this hypothesis.  
As discussed in Chapter One, it is estimated that just 14% of the population have a 
lifetime history of three or more mental disorders. This group is estimated to share more than 
half of the total population’s prevalence of lifetime mental disorder (Kessler et al., 1994). 
Severity, recurrence and health burden are also all strongly related to comorbidity 
(Gadermann et al., 2012; Kessler et al., 2005; Maj, 2005a). The National Comorbidity Survey 
– Replication study (NCS-R) demonstrated that although mental disorder is quite prevalent 
within the community, serious cases occur “among a relatively small proportion of cases with 
high comorbidity” (Kessler et al., 2005, p. 617).  
Comorbidity as an indicator of a nosological problem. 
Alternatively, evidence of high comorbidity, especially amongst community samples 
may suggest that psychiatric nosology is incorrectly parsing mental disorders from one 
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another or from normality. Conceptual subtexts to this hypothesis include that of subthreshold 
comorbidity and comorbidity across developmental trajectories. 
Categorical diagnostic cut-off criteria such as the number, duration or frequency of 
symptoms experienced, may artifactually lower estimates of prevalence of mental disorder 
within epidemiological studies. Diagnostic thresholds may also underestimate the effect that 
comorbid subthreshold syndromes or symptoms have on overall severity and disability. For 
example, analysis of data from the Zurich Cohort prospective and longitudinal study, 
suggested that it was the co-occurrence of anxiety and depressive symptomatology, rather 
than a presentation of symptoms at above diagnostic threshold, which was associated with 
symptom severity. The authors interpreted these finding as supporting the incorporation of 
dimensional approaches to classification protocol (Preisig, Merikangas, & Angst, 2001). 
Hence categorical diagnosis may artifactually change how we study, understand and represent 
the nature of mental disorder, as well as the phenomena of comorbidity. 
Comorbidity at the population level may also assist in formulating hypotheses 
regarding disorder development and aetiology. Developmental patterns of sequential versus 
cumulative comorbidity (Moffitt et al., 2007), also referred to as heterotypic versus 
homotypic comorbidity (Angold, Costello, & Erkanli, 1999), may be of particular use. 
Whereas homotypic or cumulative comorbidity refers to continuity or recurrence of the same 
disorder over time, sequential or heterotypic comorbidity refers to patterns of co-variation 
between different disorders across time. While homotypic comorbidity may indicate a 
population that experiences chronic or recurrent bouts of mental disorder across a lifetime, 
heterotypic comorbidity instead suggests that a disorder may manifest differently across time. 
Thus heterotypic comorbidity potentially undermines classification based on descriptive 
rather than etiological principles.  
Co-occurrence of disorders at the individual level has distinct implications of its own.  
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Individual level. 
Those with comorbid psychiatric diagnoses present with more symptoms and greater 
symptom complexity. This has diagnostic, prognostic and therapeutic implications for the 
individual and their clinician. However, the descriptive status of nomenclature does little to 
coherently explain an individual’s comorbid presentation or offer guidance for treatment. In 
addition, a poorer research base regarding treatment efficacy in comorbid samples may go as 
far as to discriminate against adequate service provision for these individuals. 
Unfortunately, little research has been conducted into the effect of comorbid diagnosis 
on patients’ or clients’ experiences of the psychiatric diagnostic process. It is unknown 
whether comorbid diagnosis reduces or enhances a person’s ability to make sense of his or 
her own subjective experience. Although not strictly a psychiatric or psychological condition, 
an account of twenty people’s experiences with fibromyalgia might give some insight: 
Participants described enduring the course of a ‘giant mess’ of unpleasant symptoms, 
some of which were understood to be symptoms of fibromyalgia and some the 
interactive or parallel effects of comorbid illness. The respondents also demonstrated 
their considerable efforts at imposing order and sense on complexity and multiplicity, 
in terms of the instability of their symptoms. (Dennis, Larkin, & Derbyshire, 2013, p. 
736). 
By definition those with comorbid diagnoses generally experience a broader array of 
signs and symptoms that fail to fit one set of diagnostic criteria. These presentations are 
hence often more complex than pure cases in addition to being more severe, imparting greater 
health burden and poorer prognosis (Feinstein, 1970; Gadermann et al., 2012; Maj, 2005a). 
The presentation of overlapping symptom clusters also brings increased diagnostic 
complexity. The issue of clinical complexity has important implications for the clinician, 
especially when trying to discern a chronological pathway responsible for the current 
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presentation, which may assist in making primary and secondary causal distinctions (Kessler 
& Price, 1993).  
In addition, psychiatric classification and diagnosis often fails to assist 
communication with clients or guide clinical reasoning and treatment planning. 
Supplementary to the negative effects of labelling that may result from psychiatric diagnosis, 
assignment of comorbid diagnosis can increase confusion. For example, in regards to 
developmental delay in children, where comorbidity is very high, it may be more useful to 
use specific descriptions of a child’s strengths and weaknesses than multiple diagnostic 
categories, when conceptualising a client’s presentation and communicating clinical findings 
with parents and teachers (Kaplan, Dewey, Crawford, & Wilson, 2001). Similarly, 
conceptualisation and explanation of comorbid depression and anxiety as resulting from a 
singular broad dimension of psychological functioning, may be more comprehensible and 
more accurate (Krueger, 2008).   
Part of the rationale behind the DSM-IV and DSM-5’s stance for using multiple 
diagnoses is to enable a richer characterisation of presenting symptoms. However, multiple 
diagnoses may instead obscure the focus of treatment (Pincus et al., 2004). This is especially 
pertinent given the lack of clarity or consensus regarding how comorbid disorders emerge, 
interact, and affect treatment. Given these conceptual challenges, and a lack of evidential 
guidance, clinicians often turn to their own conceptualisations and habits in order to decide 
which diagnoses are the most important or relevant in any particular case (Pincus et al., 
2004).  This lack of guidance is a very real problem given estimates that more than one third 
of those presenting at psychiatric outpatient settings meet criteria for three or more disorders 
(Zimmerman & Mattia, 1999). In fact, similar concerns have been expressed in the domain of 
physical medicine regarding the complications and unsuitability of applying multiple, best-
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practice treatment guidelines, to older persons experiencing multimorbidity (Hughes, 
McMurdo, & Guthrie, 2013). 
Again, some of these difficulties arise from the dominance of classical research 
design, which utilises pure cases or homogeneous samples to assess treatment efficacy. The 
exclusion of comorbid cases from treatment efficacy research results in findings that 
generalise poorly to clinical populations (Jensen, 2003; Krueger, 2008). Consequently such 
research is of limited value in guiding clinicians’ decisions regarding treatment. Furthermore, 
when translated into clinical guidelines, it appears more onus is placed upon the clinician to 
make the correct causal distinctions in order to follow the appropriate treatment plan.  For 
example, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidelines for 
depression in adults instructs:  
When depression is accompanied by symptoms of anxiety, the first priority should 
usually be to treat the depression. When the person has an anxiety disorder and 
comorbid depression or depressive symptoms … consider treating the anxiety 
disorder first (since effective treatment of the anxiety disorder will often improve the 
depression or the depressive symptoms). (NICE, 2009, p. 18) 
This is a case in which a non-hierarchical, descriptive classification framework offers 
little assistance. The guideline itself is also unclear whether treatment for depression or 
anxiety should be prioritised based upon causal primacy as indicated by symptom duration, 
symptom severity or symptom distress. In such situations, clinicians must return to their own 
training, experience and conceptualisations of mental disorder and comorbidity, in order to 
decide which path of treatment to follow for a particular individual.  
However, nor would a purely evidence based approach likely serve clinicians well, 
simply because it may create extreme complexity in clinical decision making given the 
considerable descriptive, if not causal heterogeneity observed in clinical practice (Pincus, 
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2012). This problem raises issues of agreement over mental disorder constructs and how well 
research data applies to clinical cases. If a very high standard of treatment efficacy evidence 
was required, alongside a very good match of descriptors or indicators between client, sample 
and construct, this would raise the complexity of clinical research and care immensely, 
potentially transforming it into an algorithmic rather than person-centred enterprise. The 
challenge therefore, is not for nosology and research to attend to every possible individual 
permutation of presentation, but to attend to comorbidity in a way that provides greater 
conceptual clarity and explanatory power.  
It could be argued that the failure of the classification system to address comorbidity 
in a meaningful way, a lack of systematic guidance regarding integrated treatment approaches 
for complex comorbid and multimorbid presentations, and a reliance upon pure sample 
research design in treatment efficacy studies, effectively represents a form of discrimination 
against a population of individuals who are particularly vulnerable to psychiatric and 
psychological distress. Support of this perspective exists by way of significant and damning 
evidence, that those who experience serious mental health conditions, have both inequitable 
access to physical health services and significantly higher mortality rates (Phelan et al., 2001; 
Prince et al., 2007). 
Integration across individual - population levels. 
Incompatibility between treatment efficacy research and clinical practice raises a 
number of questions. How well does an individual’s experience of mental disorder map onto 
concepts of mental disorder as characterised by group averages? What precisely might be lost 
in translation between these two levels? Are significant gaps in understanding created by 
mental disorders being the focus of explanation rather than the individual? Alternatively, 
would a focus on explanation of individuals’ causal sequences and presentations render an 
incomprehensible melange of idiosyncratic causes and symptoms? Furthermore, why is the 
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client or patient’s experience of diagnosis and treatment so neglected in the psychiatric and 
psychological literature? 
These questions are inescapable when addressing the phenomena of psychiatric 
comorbidity. In many ways, this crossroads between the individual and population or group 
level also highlights a crossroads between concepts, explanations and method. It signals not 
only that our nosology needs improvement, but also, that whatever solutions we find need to 
coherently integrate back and forth across the population, group and disorder level to be 
applied at the individual and clinical practice level. 
Outside of clinical practice, literature and research regarding comorbidity is generally 
focused at the population or disorder level. It is therefore important to keep in mind the need 
for inter-level integration in the following exploration of concepts of comorbidity. Concepts 
of comorbidity in relation to physical medicine and status quo DSM-5 models of disorder are 
described, prior to analysis in following chapters of alternative models of mental disorder in 
light of comorbidity and its explanatory and conceptual requirements. 
Concepts of Comorbidity Within Physical Medicine  
Even within physical medicine the word comorbidity has taken on a multitude of 
different representations. The term refers to a range of phenomena that exist along a spectrum 
of etiological implications, from descriptive to causal (Zachar & Kendler, 2007). 
Comorbidity may refer to co-existing medical conditions that do not share a causal basis, or 
to a more general susceptibility to disease, or to comorbid diseases that directly share causal 
mechanisms. It is also a term that refers to both the degree of disability in an individual 
person as well as that of a specific population, such as older persons. Additionally, the 
concept has implications for public health care service delivery and budgeting (van den 
Akker et al., 1996). In fact, a variety of terms that bear relation to comorbidity have gained 
currency in medicine: multimorbidity, patient complexity and morbidity burden to name a 
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few. Yet it often remains unclear how these terms and concepts are related (Valderas, 
Starfield, Sibbald, Salisbury, & Roland, 2009). 
A call for more precise use of the varying constructs prevails in internal medicine in 
order to better address the goals of different contexts. Thus the meaning of comorbidity, or its 
replacement concepts, should differ depending on whether the goals are related to clinical, 
epidemiological or public health research. In clinical settings constructs should be formed 
based on their ability to guide patient management. In specialist care the term comorbidity 
may serve well, but in primary care, multimorbidity may be more appropriate. In 
epidemiological research both terms have utility, especially in relation to chronology and 
mapping etiological pathways. In public health, patient complexity and overall disease 
burden gain more relevance for summarising and quantifying the cost of service provision 
(Valderas et al., 2009). Thus the term comorbidity in the current day remains highly reflective 
of its socio-cultural context. 
Undoubtedly the medical model has broadened significantly since Feinstein’s coining 
of the term in the 1970’s. Alongside acceptance that a multitude of factors, ranging from 
biological to political, impact upon the health of individuals and populations (Valderas et al., 
2009), a more nuanced understanding of disease aetiology has developed. This may be due in 
part to the prioritisation of chronic and age-related conditions such as diabetes and 
cardiovascular illness (Ministry of Health, 2014). 
Valderas et al. (2009) described four models of etiological association between 
medical conditions. These models are adapted from the work of Neale and Kendler (1995), 
who proposed six etiological models for comorbidity between multifactorial disorders within 
the domain of psychiatry. The four models proposed by Valderas et al. (2009) are: direct 
causation, associated risk factors, heterogeneity, and independence. 
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Figure 1. Etiological models of comorbid diseases. From Valderas et al. 
(2009, p. 361). 
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In direct causation, one of the diseases may directly cause the other, such as diabetes 
mellitus leading to cataracts. This bears resemblance to a primary-secondary distinction or 
pathogenic comorbidity (Kaplan & Feinstein, 1974). The associated risk factors model 
instead refers to a relationship between two diseases via the correlation between their 
respective risk factors. This is similar to Kaplan and Feinstein’s prognostic model. For 
example the association between the risk factors of smoking and alcohol use links co-
occurrence of pulmonary obstructive disease and liver cirrhosis. In this case pulmonary 
obstructive disease has been mechanistically caused by smoking, and liver cirrhosis 
mechanistically caused by alcohol use, but the comorbidity of the two diseases is explained 
by the correlative relationship between the risk factors rather than each other. In contrast the 
heterogeneity model associates the contribution of multiple risk factors to each comorbid 
disease. Here both ischemic heart disease and lung cancer are mechanistically caused by both 
age and smoking risk factors, but the risk factors themselves are not correlated. Finally, in the 
independence model, or distinct disease model, the signs and symptoms of each comorbid 
disease are actually caused by a third disease. This relates generally to Kaplan and Feinstein’s 
concept of diagnostic comorbidity, where the challenge relates primarily to correctly utilising 
signs, symptoms and course to discern the correct mechanistic cause. An example includes 
hypertension and headaches actually being due to a distinct third disease such as 
pheochromocytoma (a neuroendocrine tumour of the adrenal glands). As such the 
independence model does not refer to comorbidity at all, but rather the potential for 
misdiagnosis. 
As with many models, these are simplified presentations of complex clinical 
presentations. Their simplification allows a focus on some questions while ignoring others in 
order to further our knowledge and practice (Keller, 2002). The models are not mutually 
exclusive and more complex configurations may be built that incorporate multiple diseases, 
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risk factors and protective factors (Valderas et al, 2009). Moreover, it is easy to see how they 
might be extended upwards to include broader environmental and social factors that impact 
on disease risk. Thus they continue to hold value across epidemiological and public health 
contexts.  
Nonetheless, the clinical value of these etiological models of comorbidity remains 
very much in explicating the types of relationships that exist between correlative risk factors 
(disease correlates), causal mechanisms (mechanistic disease processes) and their observable 
outcomes (signs and symptoms). Moreover, the risk factors mentioned are quite proximal to 
the disease and its biological processes such as smoking, alcohol consumption and age. The 
presumed relevance of these models to clinical care is that they may clarify complex 
presentations, identify causal processes and provide a rationale to target subsequent medical 
or behavioural interventions (such as to stop smoking). Although there is capacity to include 
social and environmental factors further up a specified pathway to comorbidity, the concept 
of comorbidity itself remains grounded in the disease concept. Diseases may share causal 
mechanisms (direct causation), share proximal risk factors (heterogeneity) or co-occur 
frequently due to a relationship between risk factors. Thus in these models, while it may be 
recognised that higher level interactions influence comorbidity’s occurrence, and in turn, that 
comorbidity has ramifications beyond its biological machinations, within the context of the 
contemporary medical model, concepts and explanations of comorbidity remain disease-
bound. 
Yet this relatively narrow concept of comorbidity as disease-bound poorly equates 
with awareness within the medical profession of the effects of broader social factors such as 
family functioning or spirituality to name a few (Mueller, Plevak, & Rummans, 2001; Schor 
et al., 2003). It appears a gap may exist between the perhaps implicit concepts and models 
that clinicians utilise to understand and explain mental disorder, and the explicit theoretical 
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models that exist in the literature. This again highlights a need for integration, this time of 
broader explanatory levels with biological models of mental disorder. 
Status Quo – DSM-5 
Despite comorbidity’s central place in the psychiatric and psychological literature, its 
conceptualisation according to DSM-5 nosology remains somewhat opaque. While changes 
to its meta-structure have encouraged less absolutist perspectives, its concept of mental 
disorder remains very vulnerable to essentialist biases and reification. Thus the DSM-5 
creates conceptual uncertainty, especially with regards to comorbidity. 
Following DSM-III and DSM-III-R, Lilienfeld et al. (1994) argued that the reification 
of comorbidity was prevalent and problematic, especially due to its foundation in disease 
entities. He called for tighter terminology in the form of co-occurrence and co-variation to 
prevent assumptions of disorders as taxons. Spitzer (1994), instead viewed the term 
comorbidity as appropriate, denying implications of disease constructs and imploring its 
usefulness in reference to psychiatric disorders. Similarly, First et al. (1990) reiterated that the 
nosology was solely descriptive and thus comorbidity was merely an empirical event that 
should also be viewed as descriptive. A continued spotlight on comorbidity since that time 
has highlighted it as an issue that both informs and questions how psychiatric disorders are 
conceptualised and validated (Phillips et al., 2012a, 2012b). 
The recent DSM-5 represents a marked improvement on its predecessors as regards 
learnings from the phenomena of comorbidity. This has led to recognition that “the 
boundaries between disorders are more porous than originally perceived” (APA, 2013, p.6), 
and that symptoms assigned to single disorders may occur in other disorders. Furthermore, 
diagnosis using (in part) a dimensional framework for personality disorders is offered to 
reduce comorbidity and increase the validity of this diagnostic group.  
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DSM-5 also acknowledges the heterogeneity of disorder presentation and the 
multifactorial nature of aetiology: “The historical aspiration of achieving diagnostic 
homogeneity by progressive subtyping within disorder categories is no longer sensible; like 
most common human ills, mental disorders are heterogeneous at many levels, ranging from 
genetic risk factors to symptoms” (APA, 2013, p.12). 
The adoption of a meta-structure by which to group DSM-5 disorders was informed 
by multiple biological and psychological validators, including high comorbidity. The super-
structure, or clustering of these chapters was based upon internalising and externalising 
factors. This organisational structure signals that comorbid diagnoses may be somewhat 
expected within chapters or across sequential chapters. Each of these steps move the DSM 
nosology away from a position that promotes mental disorders as natural kinds or essences 
and towards a conceptualisation that accepts fuzzy boundaries and comorbidity as part of the 
landscape of mental disorder. 
However, the DSM-5 remains a system characterised by polythetic descriptive criteria 
and diagnostic categories. Although changes have taken place to some criteria, the 
conceptualisation of disorders and diagnostic process is largely unchanged from the DSM-IV-
TR due to a lack of scientific evidence and theory to support alternative definitions. While 
there is clearly an attempt to incorporate lessons from the comorbidity literature to improve 
validity and encourage more flexible conceptualisations of mental disorder, for all practical 
purposes, diagnosis of mental disorder is akin to that described in DSM-III half a century 
ago.  DSM-5 thus retains its prioritisation of empirical reliability over theoretical validity.  
The concept of mental disorder endorsed by the DSM-5 is also questionable. While it 
contextualises mental disorder within its socio-cultural setting, its basis lies in Wakefield’s 
harmful dysfunction (HD) analysis. Here mental disorder is conceptualised in two stages, as a 
mental function gone astray, that brings harm and distress to an individual (Wakefield, 1992). 
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Dysfunction is first objectively identified as “the failure of a mental mechanism to perform a 
natural function for which it was designed by evolution” and then its harm is evaluated 
according to prevailing social norms (p.373). Both stages are necessary in order to qualify for 
status as mental disorder. Under this concept, comorbidity becomes more than one natural 
dysfunction.  Both Murphy (2006) and Zachar (2014) provide excellent critiques of the HD 
analysis. 
Identification of dysfunction rests on an ability to objectively identify natural 
function. According to Wakefield (1992), a natural function can be understood as an ability or 
capacity, such as a threat detection system, that via the process of natural selection has 
allowed adaptation to environmental pressures to enable survival. Both Murphy and Zachar 
cited the absolute paucity of existing factual evidence for the existence of natural functions, 
as sufficient reason to discredit the HD analysis. While maintaining its foundation in 
evolutionary explanation, Wakefield did subsequently reframe his concept of natural function 
to refer to the effect of a mechanism that contributes to an explanation of the said 
mechanism’s “existence, structure or activity” (Wakefield, 2007, p. 152). Simply stated, a 
natural function is a mechanism’s reason for being. Rather than evidence or theories of 
evolutionary development, this concept of natural function looks to objective evidence of a 
mechanism’s effects, existence, structures or activities as supportive of adaptive functioning 
in the here and now. 
Murphy (2006) argued that evidence does not support the notion that psychological 
functions link to functionally distinguishable components of the brain, thereby, limited 
evidence exists in favour of identifying natural functions via neuro-anatomical analysis. In 
addition, he explained that dysfunction can be brought about both through a faulty 
mechanism that receives adequate information (for example a reading disorder in the context 
of educational support), and by a normal mechanism operating with deviant input (illiteracy 
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due to lack of educational opportunity). Wakefield (2007) argued that the former is a disorder 
where the latter is not, however, the distinction becomes less clear in other examples where 
the dysfunction may be adaptive in some environments but not in others. For example, a 
tendency to dissociate due to a history of sexual abuse is a case where an arguably adaptive 
function becomes maladaptive due to causes embedded in personal history. In such instances 
however, the HD analysis does not assist in understanding whether the dysfunction is due to a 
faulty dissociation capacity, an inability to accurately detect threat, a dysregulated emotion 
response mechanism, or to a particular set of beliefs, perceptions and interpretations of the 
self or world. Potentially all processes may play a role. Even when freed from its 
evolutionary explanatory basis, the HD analysis cannot objectively identify dysfunction in a 
reliable manner and therefore, cannot be used to answer the question “what is a mental 
disorder?”  
While the HD analysis is in many ways an elegant attempt at defining a very slippery 
concept, in promoting this conceptualisation, the DSM-5 may have encouraged a form of 
psychological essentialism amongst its users. If mental disorder is understood as a 
“dysfunction in the biological, psychological or developmental processes underlying mental 
functioning” (APA, 2013, p. 20), it is easy to assume that it is the underlying dysfunctional 
process that requires intervention. In this light, disorders take on essential qualities, as it is the 
dysfunctional mechanism or mechanisms that denote a disorder with its identity. Placing 
social norms at a separate evaluative stage emphasises that the cause is dysfunctional rather 
than the outcome. 
In summary the DSM-5 gives mixed messages. While its organisational meta-
structure signals a need to think flexibly about the boundaries between disorders, its 
categorical approach and definition of mental disorder based in the HD analysis endorses 
more rigid and less integrative conceptualisations. As concepts of comorbidity are couched in 
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concepts of mental disorder, such ill-defined territory creates difficulties for understanding 
comorbidity. Given the DSM’s descriptive, atheoretical status, comorbidity can be construed 
simply as an empirical phenomena of signs and symptoms that spread across diagnostic 
boundaries. To some extent this is the approach encouraged in the description of comorbidity 
that follows each diagnosis’ criteria set. However, the meta-organisational structure, together 
with acknowledgement that mental disorders are heterogeneous, indicates that comorbidity 
may be more expected in some instances than others. It is hard to differentiate therefore, 
whether comorbidity should be conceived of as separate disorders that co-occur due to shared 
risk or causal factors, or in fact, whether comorbidity does not actually exist but instead 
occupies a space on a spectrum or dimension that adjoins different disorders.  
These conceptual inconsistencies within the DSM may lead clinicians to return to 
their own beliefs and conceptualisations of mental disorder in order to reason about causative 
processes. One of the strengths of an atheoretical approach is that it leaves room for multiple 
explanatory perspectives. However, in the absence of relevant research or clinical guidelines 
regarding treatment efficacy for comorbid or multimorbid presentations these 
conceptualisations and causative inferences may serve as the primary basis for treatment 
planning. Furthermore, concepts of the nature and cause of mental disorder, influenced by 
both training and experience (Piotrowski, 2007), may easily fall prey to reification via an 
essentialist bias, or alternatively, become unnecessarily complicated and lack clarity. While 
conceptualisations of comorbidity remain inconsistent and the treatment efficacy research 
remains unclear, it is hard to know which level or levels of explanation should be targeted, 
which treatment option is more effective, and how the largest long-term and short-term gains 
to well-being might be made in return for cost to the individual, insurer or state. 
Comorbidity, therefore, highlights both strengths and inadequacies of DSM-5’s 
descriptive and atheoretical classificatory stance. In leaving room for construal of cause at 
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different levels, it paints a watercolour landscape upon which the subjective perspective of 
the clinician is applied to interpret how different causative factors might integrate together. 
Moreover, given the dominance of DSM categories in shaping research samples, this 
subjective interpretation is then reapplied to decide which factors should be prioritised for 
treatment.  
Summary 
As argued in Chapter One, the problem of comorbidity in current psychiatric 
diagnosis lays down a specific ethical challenge: to improve outcomes for those who 
experience comorbid psychiatric disorders. This thesis focuses on coherent concepts and 
explanations of comorbidity as a strategy to meet this goal: so that the individual 
experiencing mental disorder may be assisted in making sense of their experience; for the 
development of effective treatments and interventions; and to aid clinicians in carrying out 
the roles of assessment, communication and application of treatment with the client. 
Diagnosis, through the scientific practice of nosology, plays an integral role in meeting these 
objectives by providing a link from research to clinic and vice versa. Thus nosology is central 
to attempts to meet the stated ethical challenge we currently face. 
Four concepts of comorbidity have been outlined in this chapter: comorbidity at the 
population and individual levels alongside comorbidity as described and understood in 
physical and mental health domains, specifically the DSM-5. Whichever perspective is 
considered, the meaning of the term derives from the meaning inherent in concepts of 
wellness, disease and disorder. Concepts of psychiatric comorbidity are thus dependent upon 
concepts of mental disorder.  
Bearing in mind that concepts of mental disorder and comorbidity may not be 
explicitly expressed, clarification via nosology seems an important objective. The lack of 
clarity regarding psychiatric comorbidity in particular springs jointly from the multiple 
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perspectives influencing concepts of mental disorder, and the lack of consensus regarding 
how to integrate varying but often complementary conceptualisations that exist across 
different theoretical levels.  
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Chapter Four - Common Cause Models of Mental Disorder  
High comorbidity at the disorder or population level continues to challenge the 
validity of psychiatric nosology. Bogenschutz and Nurnberg (2000) remarked that a number 
of methodological flaws may lead to spurious comorbidity. In some instances, an apparent 
association between diagnoses may reflect a nosological artefact. Examples cited included 
comorbidity due to phenotypic heterogeneity (where different phenotypic characteristics are 
expressions of the same underlying disease), and comorbidity due to the creation of artificial 
categorical boundaries where dimensional methods may serve better for conceptualising 
mental disorder. Spurious comorbidity serves little or no explanatory power, having been 
brought about artificially as a result of a flawed nosology. Valid comorbidity instead would 
hold explanatory significance and signal either distinct but shared etiological factors in co-
occurring disorders (either at the direct causal or slightly removed risk factor level), or the 
influence of one disorder in the development of another.   
In response, many have voiced a desire for classification based upon either (or in 
some cases both) a dimensional or etiological basis, rather than the descriptive framework 
utilised by the DSM (Aragona, 2009b; Hyman, 2010; Morris & Cuthbert, 2012). Others 
instead have championed dimensional methods as a way to understand the current 
relationships observed between DSM diagnoses via unifying latent causes (Clark, 2005; 
Krueger & Markon, 2006; Vaidyanathan, Patrick, & Iacono, 2011). The following chapters 
echo a dialogue between Massimiliano Aragona (2009a, 2009b) and Peter Zachar (2009) 
based on the significance of comorbidity to concepts and models of mental disorder.  
Aragona (2009a) argued that the ‘hypercomorbidity” observed in psychiatric 
diagnosis is a nosological artefact, an anomaly indicative of a Khunian crisis that “challenges 
the credibility of the system itself” (p. 30). Here, comorbidity heralds the call for a paradigm 
shift in classification practices. Zachar (2009), instead, challenged the notion that psychiatric 
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comorbidity will disappear with changes to nosology and argued that “the phenomena 
covered by the term ‘comorbidity’ are real, expectable features of the psychiatric domain,” 
although comorbidity may be “lowered and provided a better, evidence-based conceptual 
framework” (p.13). In this instance comorbidity is characterised as an inevitable consequence 
of attempts to classify mental disorder, due to the interconnected nature of the brain and the 
nature of human functioning within the external environment.  
Comorbidity Existence Conditions 
Prior to considering this dialogue, a workable concept of comorbidity needs to be 
articulated that will suffice across the range of perspectives for which it will be utilised. For 
this purpose, comorbidity is considered to exist if:  
a) A discriminable set of causal processes are, reliably associated with a set or cluster 
of symptoms; and 
b) The symptoms are generally accepted as harmful, distressing or impairing; and 
c) More than one causal process or causal processes co-occur; 
d) At any one time; 
e) At a rate within the population that is higher than might be expected by chance. 
Criteria ‘a’ and ‘b’ essentially form the criteria for mental disorder. Similar to the HD 
analysis it has both a causal and evaluative component. However, the causal component is not 
nested in the concept of objectively identifiable dysfunction, instead the effect of the causal 
processes (cluster of symptoms) is evaluated as dysfunctional (relative to social norms). Thus 
it is the resultant effect that is deemed dysfunctional, rather than the causal process. It may be 
useful to extend the concept of symptom sets to a concept of syndromes that entails shared 
symptoms, signs, course, and treatment response (Kendler 2012). 
The above existence conditions are by no means a comprehensive definition of 
comorbidity or mental disorder, but instead, provide some grounding and constraints from 
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which to utilise the concept of comorbidity in the following analysis. Their emphasis lies not 
in a conceptual analysis of what differentiates disorder from normal functioning but instead, 
what properties characterise comorbidity. They also focus on causal mechanisms.  
A useful concept to employ when considering mental disorder as a set of causal 
processes is the “mechanistic property cluster” (Kendler et al., 2011). Members of a cluster, 
in this case instances of a disorder, occupy a similar region in a multi-dimensional matrix 
space due to their similar causal mechanisms and properties. The causal dimensions may 
represent different features or symptoms of mental disorder, as well as causes across multiple 
levels. Note that this concept denotes symptoms with potential causal influence. While 
clusters may not have essential qualities, where all members share the same features with 
each other, they nonetheless exhibit relatively stable causal patterns and relationships that 
result in their position within the multi-dimensional matroid space. Causal relationships may 
be probabilistic as well as deterministic under this concept. 
 
Figure 2. “One possibility for a property cluster kind in which individual clinical features 
(labelled F1 to F5) are causally inter-related to one another.” From Kendler et al. (2011, p. 
1147) 
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As argued in Chapter One, causal explanations often form the foundation upon which 
scientific concepts are shaped. With regards to comorbidity, a higher standard of explanation 
is required: an explanation of comorbidity must be coherent and integrative.  
Causal mechanisms or explanations must be reliably associated with symptom 
clusters. This means that causal effects may be either mechanistically demonstrated, or more 
likely, risk factors or constructs are reliably associated with an effect via statistical modelling. 
The main concern for separating comorbidity from general heterogeneity is that causal 
processes are discriminable.  That is, although they may be interactive with other causal 
processes or networks, they are not so interactive as to make them indistinguishable from 
other systems or any superordinate systems within which they operate. If the processes at 
work that result in symptom sets are not discriminable, then mental disorder is inherently 
heterogeneous. In this way comorbidity offers an opportunity to test whether mental disorders 
are so inherently heterogeneous that they cannot be classified except on the basis of 
pragmatic goals. 
Additionally this concept of comorbidity insists that discernible causal processes must 
co-occur at the same time. Despite the concept of mental disorder being given an explanatory 
basis, we may still expect some disorders to co-occur at higher rates than others. However, 
we may hope that a nosology, with its theoretical and empirical underpinning, may be able to 
provide coherent explanation of this sort of comorbidity, which in this instance is identical to 
Lilienfeld et al.’s (1994) co-variation. We would not however expect such coherent 
explanation of all co-occurrence; this would result in explanatory models representative of 
the idiosyncratic individual. This again would indicate heterogeneity.  
 With this in mind it may be useful to consider a continuum. At one end is a concept 
of mental disorders as causal pathways or networks with discrete and homogeneous 
properties that lead to clear and distinct syndromes. This is consistent with the ‘hard’ medical 
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model (Kendler, 2012). At the other end is a concept of mental disorder as fully reflexive, 
where causes, networks and effects are so integrated with each other that causal pathways and 
symptom clusters become impossible to discriminate from one another. It is a possibility that 
some mental disorders exist in different zones along this continuum.  
The concept of comorbidity therefore tests two premises: 1) that disorders are 
discriminable enough so as not to be completely heterogeneous; 2) that disorders are not 
completely invariant in their co-occurrence. This second supposition enables coherent, 
integrative explanations and concepts of comorbidity to exist beyond individualised, 
idiosyncratic disorder combinations. It also distinguishes comorbidity from simply a more 
severe or more complex manifestation of a single disorder. 
As discussed in Chapter One, Kendler (2012) outlined seven criteria that indicate a 
good explanation: strength, causal confidence, generalizability, specificity, manipulability, 
proximity and generativity. In the following analysis these criteria, in addition with the need 
for coherent explanation are applied across a range of models of mental disorder. As 
discussed, coherence, in the context of explaining comorbidity, may require a certain level of 
integration between causal hypotheses. 
Two common cause models are considered: models based in latent causal constructs 
and pathogenetic models of mental disorder. Dimensional models also offer an alternative 
approach to current classificatory practices, however, given limited space and the explicit 
focus on testing an etiological classification strategy, they are excluded from the following 
discussion. 
Latent Causal Models of Mental Disorder 
Several models of mental disorder based on latent constructs explicitly posit an 
underlying common cause. These models analyse current patterns of comorbidity as a means 
to understand the nature and structure of mental disorder. Alternatively this can be viewed as 
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an attempt to explain current comorbidity as due to hypothetical latent causal constructs. 
Three such models include Clark’s model of comorbid personality and psychopathology as 
based in temperament (2005), Krueger and Markon’s liability spectrum model of comorbidity 
(2006), and Vaidyanathan, Patrick and Iocono’s person-centred characterisation of 
comorbidity (2011). 
Clark’s (2005) model attends to the relationship between personality and 
psychopathology, often demonstrated as comorbidity at the diagnostic level, or more 
generally, as sub-threshold personality characteristics that co-occur alongside mental disorder 
diagnoses. It explicitly posits a shared underlying cause in the form of temperament. 
Temperament is understood to have a genetic basis that shapes the development of 
personality structure through interaction with the environment over time. Three temperament 
dimensions of negative affectivity, positive affectivity and disinhibition, are posited in this 
way to causally underlie a hierarchical personality trait structure. Those traits and subtraits 
associated with the same temperament dimension are expected to be more closely related 
than those from different dimensions. It is the interplay between disinhibition and negative 
affectivity that appears particularly relevant to the development of psychopathology. 
Clark suggested that personality and psychopathology are linked via these underlying 
temperament risk factors and their subsequent interactions with life experiences, especially 
adverse life events. The theory posits latent constructs, in the form of three temperament 
dimensions, as causal factors that interact with environmental factors to bring about the 
observed phenomena – personality and psychopathology. Thus the hypothesis is both 
etiological and developmental. 
A similar model of comorbidity was proposed by Krueger and Markon (2006) in a 
meta-analysis of a “liability spectrum model of comorbidity”.  Here comorbidity was also 
explained via underlying liabilities that manifest differentially. Their work was an extension 
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of the bivariate etiological models of comorbidity described in Chapter Three, proposed by 
Neale and Kendler (1995). Krueger and Markon’s meta-analysis tested the fit of data from 
five large, population based studies (utilising DSM defined categorical diagnoses), to various 
multivariate structural equation models. It demonstrated that multivariate comorbidity models 
converged on a hierarchical model with two superordinate constructs labelled internalising 
and externalising liabilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evidence points to these liabilities existing as continua, which is how constructs are 
conceptualised in Krueger and Markon’s (2006), Neale and Kendler’s (1995), and Clark’s 
(2005) models. The externalising construct indicates a liability towards substance use 
disorder, antisocial personality disorder and conduct disorder.  The internalising construct 
indicates a liability towards mood and anxiety disorders, which can further be divided into a 
distress sub-construct that encompasses depression, dysthymia and generalised anxiety 
disorder, and a fear sub-construct consisting of panic disorder/agoraphobia, social phobia and 
 
Figure 3. “Bivariate and multivariate comorbidity models: (a) associated liabilities 
model, (b) multiformity model, (c) causation models, (d) independence model, and (e) 
a hypothetical multivariate model.” From Krueger and Markon (2006, p. 119). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF COMORBIDITY          61 
 
 
specific phobias. The superordinate internalising and externalising constructs are highly 
correlated with each other, as are the subordinate distress and fear constructs. It was upon this 
basis that the DSM-5 chapter order was reshuffled to give some explanatory value to the high 
comorbidity observed within internalising and externalising disorders.  
However, the comorbidity frequently observed between internalising and 
externalising disorders such as depression and substance use disorder, challenges this 
hierarchical structure. Vaidyanathan et al. (2011), building on Krueger and Markon’s (2006) 
work, utilised a class analysis method to characterise patterns of lifetime comorbidity 
observed at the individual level. This study’s aim was to investigate what patterns of 
comorbid disorders are seen in individuals rather than what disorders commonly co-occur, 
and in doing so, it sought clarification of the observed correlation between internalising and 
externalising dimensions. 
Utilising NCS and NCS-R data, the study converged with previous evidence, 
identifying a fear class of individuals (experiencing comorbid phobias and panic disorder), a 
distress class (depression, dysthymia and GAD), and an externalising class (conduct disorder 
and substance abuse), as well as a class of individuals exhibiting few disorders (low 
incidence of mental disorder). It also pointed to two main sources for the overlap between 
internalising and externalising factors: a multimorbid class of individuals and a group of 
disorders occurring across all classes (including the few-disorders class) at higher rates than 
predicted by chance.  
The multimorbid class included individuals with high levels of both internalising and 
externalising disorders, as well as bipolar 1 disorder. This multimorbid class bears 
resemblance to Zachar’s vulnerable population. Individuals within this group demonstrated 
the highest rates of overall comorbidity as well as the greatest overall severity of 
psychopathology. The cross-class group of disorders included depression, social phobia and 
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PTSD, leading the authors to suggest that these disorders may reflect more general ways in 
which people within the larger population manifest distress in reaction to adverse life 
experiences such as loss, stress or trauma. Thus people with existing diatheses in 
internalising, externalising or multimorbid domains, may be more vulnerable to 
psychological distress in general, manifesting as increased prevalence of these three disorders 
across classes. 
This study therefore also makes specific etiological claims regarding: 1) underlying 
vulnerabilities as exemplified in the broad internalising and externalising dimensions leading 
to manifestation of mental disorder; 2) a multimorbid class of individuals demonstrating 
liability to severe psychological distress and high comorbidity; 3) heightened psychological 
distress in those with such vulnerabilities via mechanisms normative in the general 
population. 
In summary, models of mental disorder built on latent constructs conceptualise mental 
disorder as caused by an underlying vulnerability in combination with other factors such as 
life events. Such vulnerability is understood as a continuous dimension upon which an 
individual may measure. Such models utilise the common cause assumption implicit in factor 
analysis, where observable measures are thought to cohere due to an underlying latent cause 
or set of latent causes (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; Zachar, 2000, 2014). 
Clark (2005) was explicit in conceptualising negative affectivity, positive affectivity 
and disinhibition as temperament constructs founded in genetic cause.  This inference relies 
on abductive reasoning to identify causal processes that might explain why observable 
variables cluster in this way. Thus it is a placeholder or what Haig (2014) identifies as a 
theory generation device to direct empirical and theoretical investigation, in this case towards 
genetic and environmental mechanisms.   
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Vaidyanathan et al. (2011) were also explicit in relating vulnerability constructs to 
underlying genetic cause. They extended their explanation to posit specific disorder 
manifestation via interactions between underlying vulnerability with life events, potentially 
mediated by general and normative psychological processes, as demonstrated by the cross-
class disorders. They made no a priori assumptions regarding the respective effect size of 
genes, life events or general psychological processes in the aetiology of mental disorder. 
Similarly their model acts as a theory generation device.  
Krueger and Markon’s model (2006) also implied an underlying structure to mental 
disorder. However this model rested on the assumptions of the statistical analysis as means of 
justifying the taxonomy. Their analysis tested the fit of various structural models of mental 
disorder to data from multiple studies. This method equates with hypothesis testing rather 
than theory generation (Haig, 2014). As a result they argued that the manifestations of 
specific DSM mental disorders are for all purposes valid if conceived of as existing within a 
hierarchical structure and cohering due to these internalising and externalising vulnerabilities. 
The basis for their model, and their reconceptualisation of psychopathology in line with 
superordinate and subordinate liability constructs, was their analysis of comorbidity data. 
However, like Vaidyanathan et al. (2011), their analysis was built upon data generated 
by diagnostic interview. Therefore while the model has much to say about the hierarchical 
structure of mental disorder as assessed by DSM diagnoses, it can say little about the 
underlying nature of mental disorder away from these predefined taxons. This is because the 
validity of their model rested upon the validity of the data as representative of the features of 
mental disorder. Of course such challenges are not unique to these methods, but are 
particularly important to consider in analyses that are so empirically driven.  
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Kline (1998) warned of the danger of going beyond the data in this way when he 
stated that “factors are not necessarily determinants… Factors depend entirely on the 
variables in the analysis”(p.68). 
In summary, the concept of mental disorder that follows from these latent causal 
models is that manifestation of specific mental disorder is caused by a liability, most probably 
of genetic cause, in concert with environmental and potentially normative psychological 
mechanisms. This concept is etiologically driven. It is also in line with the biopsychosocial 
model of mental disorder. Comorbidity’s conceptualisation is simpler. It results from the 
shared (genetic) liability that underlies two comorbid disorders. In those instances where 
comorbidity is unexpected, such as between an internalising disorder and externalising 
disorder, it is explained as either due to a genetic liability in concert with manifestation of 
psychopathology via normative psychological processes, or heightened overall vulnerability 
to severe psychopathology. In regard to the multimorbid group, comorbidity becomes 
difficult to separate from severity.  
The nosological implication of these models of comorbidity is that diagnoses should 
be considered as existing within overarching liability continua. Thus the model does not 
reduce the incidence of comorbidity, but instead seeks to explain it. Hence, organising DSM-
5 chapters around these internalising and externalising liabilities has served to provide the 
existing nosology with improved conceptual and explanatory coherence. 
How does the model respond to the challenges of comorbidity? It does offer a 
somewhat coherent concept of comorbidity via latent genetic risk. With reference to the 
aforementioned explanatory criteria (Kendler, 2012), this speaks to the explanatory strength, 
generalizability, and the likely causal role of latent genetic risk in bringing about comorbid 
presentations. This model also offers a pluralist explanation of comorbidity in drawing on 
several levels of analysis (genetic risk, life events, psychological processes). Inclusion of 
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environmental and psychological processes has the potential to increase its explanatory 
specificity and proximity, helping to answer why two disorders may manifest together at this 
time.  
However its concepts, explanation and integration remain very broad. Although latent 
constructs may assist in coherent explanation of comorbidity under the current classificatory 
system, they are unlikely on their own to answer the knowledge and ethical challenges that 
comorbidity generates. This becomes especially obvious when considering the multimorbid 
group. Does increased genetic vulnerability to multimorbidity in concert with normative 
psychological processes cause greater severity overall, or does liability in combination with 
different life events cause manifestation of multiple separate disorders? The model is unclear 
in this regard as the causal interactions are not its focus. As Berenbaum claimed, “there is a 
wide variety of reasons why signs and symptoms may covary other than their all being 
manifestations of independent latent disorders” (2013, p. 895).  
Therefore the liability constructs, environmental effects and psychological 
mechanisms posited, act as placeholders and theory generation devices (Haig, 2014) for yet 
to be developed explanations about why comorbidity between DSM-5 diagnoses occurs and 
how particular comorbid presentations come into being.  Kendler (2012) indicated that as a 
statistical concept, latent genetic risk offers little guidance for treatment development or 
application. With regards to comorbidity, latent causal models offer no details of the 
interactions and processes between causes and hence offer limited integrative explanation. 
They act as a potential guide, relying on other methods to flesh out the causal processes. 
“Ultimately, research that incorporates findings from multiple perspectives of interrelations 
among differing mental disorders is likely to contribute most to understanding, remediation, 
and prevention, of disorders of this type” (Vaidyanathan et al., 2011, p. 8). 
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Pathogenetic Models of Mental Disorder 
A structure differentiating pathogenetic from pathophysiological processes (discussed 
in the next chapter), is borrowed from Oulis (2010). He identified pathogenetic processes as 
establishing a set of primary and distal genetic risk factors that may increase vulnerability to 
development of mental disorder. Pathophysiological processes however are broadly 
construed, encompassing more proximal processes, including the person’s interactions with 
systems in the immediate environment, that lead to the emergent clinical presentation via 
physiological dysfunction. 
The pathogenetic model of mental disorder centres its causal hypothesis at the genetic 
and molecular levels of analysis. Multiple twin studies have indicated that genetic factors 
contribute towards aetiology of many mental disorders such as schizophrenia, depression and 
anxiety disorders (Hettema, Neale, & Kendler, 2001; Sullivan, Kendler, & Neale, 2003; 
Sullivan, Neale, & Kendler, 2000). In particular the heritability of liability to schizophrenia is 
estimated to be very high, at between 73% and 90% (Sullivan et al., 2003), making it a 
priority to find the gene or group of genes responsible for this severe disorder. However, 
evidence suggests that genes associated with schizophrenia are also associated with bipolar 
disorder. Similar genotypes may therefore underlie different phenotypic presentations, 
indicating that elucidation of pathophysiological mechanisms will further challenge the 
validity of current classification (Craddock, O'Donovan, & Owen, 2006).  
Taking this a step further, a recent article authored by the Cross-Disorder Group of the 
Psychiatric Genomics Consortium (2013) detailed a ‘mega-analysis’ of genomes sourced 
from 33,332 individuals who met criteria for one of five disorders: schizophrenia, bipolar 
disorder, major depressive disorder, autism spectrum disorder or attention-deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Also included was a genome-wide analysis of 27,888 control 
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cases. This study identified single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNP’s) at four loci4. Here 
significance indicates that the genetic ‘signal’ of these SNP’s exceeded a designated 
threshold5.  
Specifically, the aggregate risk scores generated from occurrence of these four 
polymorphisms indicated cross-disorder effects for the three adult-onset disorders included in 
the study, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Nominal effects 
were also observed for the two childhood onset disorders included in the study. The authors 
interpreted these findings as indicative of pleiotropic genetic effects. Pleiotropic effects are 
already documented in autoimmune and metabolic diseases, where (in its simplest form) 
variance at one gene may lead to many different phenotypic presentations, presentations that 
currently cross diagnostic boundaries. This concept is akin to that of phenotypic 
heterogeneity described earlier (Bogenschutz & Nurnberg, 2000). In addition, given two of 
the SNP’s identified were involved in calcium-channel signalling, the authors suggested that 
this biological mechanism may be a key contributor to pathogenesis of a number of mental 
disorders, indicating it as a potential target for treatment. They stated that their findings were 
“relevant to the goal of moving beyond descriptive syndromes in psychiatry and towards a 
nosology informed by disease cause” (Cross-Disorder Group of the Psychiatric Genomics 
Consortium, 2013, p.17). 
This statement strongly expresses a concept of mental disorder as a disease process, 
with explanatory priority given to the genetic level of analysis and its immediate 
physiological consequences via protein expression, molecular signalling and cellular 
mechanisms. Unlike Mendelian genetic disorders such as Huntington’s disease and cystic 
                                                        
4 This included two SNP’s in regions on chromosomes three and ten (the former region 
encompassing more than 30 genes), and two SNP’s involved in calcium-channel signalling, 
that showed a significant association across all five mental disorders considered. 
5 p < 5x10-8 
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fibrosis, it is likely that multiple genetic factors are involved in the pathogenesis of mental 
disorders. A classification system based in this model would need to utilise an aggregative 
genetic risk profile or similar to identify the constellation of underlying genetic causes. 
This model has much in common with latent genetic risk models such as Clark’s 
(2005) temperament construct. However, a genetic risk profile, although also a statistically 
generated device is directly linked to specific biological casual factors. It is grounded in 
biological mechanistic explanation. In quantifying the risk associated with specific alleles, it 
acts as the statistical reverse of a latent genetic construct. Instead of abductively inferring 
underlying explanation of observable features, a genetic risk profile seeks to predict the effect 
size of specific genetic causal factors. This is a deductive enterprise. Diagnosis based on a 
genetic profile would therefore be based in an inductive application of research that identified 
a certain phenotype was probably caused by a specific array of alleles. This concept matches 
well with the concept of an endophenotype: 
An intermediate phenotype (often referred to as an endophenotype) is a quantitative 
biological trait that is reliable and reasonably heritable…. If a candidate intermediate 
phenotype is to provide meaningful information about a disorder, it should be 
associated with variant alleles that distinguish patients and their unaffected siblings 
from healthy controls on quantitative measures. The most useful intermediate 
phenotype candidates will also be functionally associated with aspects of the core 
clinical deficits of the disorder. (Preston & Weinberger, 2005, p. 166) 
Different disorders would therefore be conceptualised based upon the endophenotype 
associated with their phenotypic symptom clusters. While some alleles may be associated 
with a general risk to mental disorder due to their generic mechanistic effects (such as posited 
for calcium channel signalling), others may heighten risk for specific phenotypic 
presentations.  
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Alternatively, interactions between genetic effects at the molecular and cellular levels 
may be found to result in specific phenotypic effects. As a result, advances in biomarkers at 
the molecular or cellular level of analysis could be utilised to complement a genetically 
driven concept of mental disorder. A concept of mental disorder grounded in genetics 
therefore, may not wholly operate at the genetic level, instead it may span presence of 
particular alleles and the identification of direct downstream molecular consequences.  
Referring back to the comorbidity existence conditions stated earlier, comorbidity 
may be conceptualised as more than one endophenotype as observed in the analysis of an 
individual’s genome. The concept may also include presence of more than one set or system 
of molecular and cellular processes resulting from the genome’s configuration. Classification 
in this instance is a statistical construct, such as an endophenotype, that confers risk via 
biological mechanistic explanation. It may also include presence of molecular markers that 
indicate that more than one set of biological causal processes is at play.  Current comorbidity 
would certainly be considered an artefact due to the incorrect parsing of disorders based on 
phenotypic presentation, especially given that evidence of pleiotropic effects already points to 
this being the case.  
How would a concept of mental disorder as pathogenetic perform in relation to 
comorbidity’s knowledge challenges? It remains uncertain whether the incidence of comorbid 
diagnosis would be significantly reduced through classification based on endophenotypes and 
molecular markers. It also remains uncertain whether an etiological foundation in genetics 
would provide comorbid diagnosis with an integrative coherent explanation for either the 
client or clinician, or for the development of treatments and interventions. This is because 
while twin studies demonstrate that heritability of mental disorders is relatively high, 
indicating robustness across different background conditions, genetic analyses for most 
mental disorders show small effect sizes. Even aggregate genetic risk profiles continue to 
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prove insufficient for diagnostic or predictive purposes (Cross-Disorder Group of the 
Psychiatric Genomics Consortium, 2013). While genetic endophenotypes are likely have a 
considerable causal role, other physiological, or environmental factors also play a significant 
role in the aetiology of mental disorder. In addition, genetic antecedents also show low 
proximity to mental disorder (Kendler, 2012). 
A number of concerns regarding the causal role of endophenotypes have also been 
voiced (Kendler & Neale, 2010). Models based on endophenotypes need to distinguish 
between a mediational (causal) and risk indicator (correlational) models. The concept 
presented here relies upon a mediational model, where the endophenotype is either 
mechanistically or statistically (via structural equation modelling) shown to causally effect 
the resultant phenotype. Mediational models also need to demonstrate strong reliability. A 
founding in genetics does not excuse models of high measurement error between participants 
or within participants across time. Additionally, consideration of partial mediation models is 
necessary, especially given evidence of environmental effects in aetiology of mental disorder. 
Endophenotypes may also actually reflect environmental effects such as in utero infections, 
birth complications, or maternal substance use (Kendler & Neale, 2010). The low strength 
and above methodological concerns challenge this model’s explanatory coherence. However, 
pathogenetic models of mental disorder indirectly offer relatively high manipulability via 
development of pharmaceutical treatments (Kendler, 2012). 
Finally, coherent explanation of comorbidity rests on an ability to integrate 
explanations of separate mental disorders in order to explain the singular comorbid 
presentation as observed in an individual or group. This would largely depend on the model’s 
ability to mechanistically explain interactions between endophenotypes, their physiological 
consequences and observed phenotypic effects. Given evidence of the role that environmental 
factors plays in shaping phenotypic display, it is unlikely that a genetic model of mental 
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disorder would explain a sufficient amount of the variance observed to function alone as a 
coherent explanation of comorbidity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are also potential ethical issues associated with this model, which 
conceptualises mental disorder as inherent to the person. Mental disorder largely becomes an 
issue of protein expression as coded for by dysfunctional genes. Given that genes themselves 
 
Figure 4. “(a) A liability-index model for endophenotypes (EPs). Genetic variance VG 
influences both an EP and a psychiatric disorder (PD). These observed variables also 
have residual variation, RVE and RVP, due to other sources. (b) A mediational model for 
EPs. Genetic variance causes variation in the EP, which in turn causes variation in PD. 
EP and PD have residual variance components RVEP and RVPD, respectively.” From 
Kendler and Neale (2010, p. 791) 
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are not easily manipulable, disorder remains resident within the individual’s genome 
essentially from birth until death. Thus, functional change would probably be achieved by 
changing molecular processes via (most likely) lifelong pharmaceutical treatment, or 
potentially in some cases, early intervention. This may be somewhat applicable for certain 
cases of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and autism, but the notion is contrary to the 
demonstrated efficacy of psychological treatments such as cognitive behavioural therapy for 
anxiety and depressive disorder. 
Using a concept of comorbidity as posited in the existence conditions, two models of 
mental disorder have been analysed in this chapter. While latent causal models act as theory 
generation devices, suggesting avenues for future research, they fail to meet the desired 
explanatory standards due to their empirical reliance and lack of causal explication. 
Alternatively, pathogenetic models may in future offer strong causal explanation and 
manipulability, yet alone, are likely to fail to account for the variant features of mental 
disorder brought about through interaction with environmental factors. In the following 
chapter, pathophysiological models of mental disorder are considered in light of 
comorbidity’s explanatory and ethical challenges, alongside two epistemological strategies: 
emergent simplification and integrative pluralism. 
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Chapter Five - Emergent Simplification Versus Integrative Pluralism  
Mental Disorder as Pathophysiological Dysfunction 
Although a causal account of mental disorder (and arguably many physical disorders) 
as the consequence of multi-factorial, multi-level, systems interactions is likely more accurate 
(Kendler, 2012), once explanations and models of mental disorder encompass environmental 
effects they become significantly more complicated. Simplification strategies may be used to 
make explanations and manipulations more tractable, understandable and manageable. 
Alternatively, simplification may be based upon an assumption that a particular level of 
analysis is either more usefully exploited or more causally central in any consequential 
manifestation of mental disorder. 
Oulis (2010) described pathophysiological mechanisms as being central to 
understanding, classifying and treating mental disorder. Although mechanisms are integrated 
in complex systems across many levels, from biological to psychological to social, “the final 
effects of all types of psychopathological mechanisms are necessarily mediated by 
individuals’ minding brains through their impact on them.” He continued to say that “brain 
systems carrying out mental functions are the central or ultimate referents of 
psychopathological explanations, though not necessarily the more weighty ones”(Oulis, 2010, 
p.30.). In this view, another reason to focus on the level of psychophysiological dysfunction 
is that it is likely to be proximal to any consequential distress. Although distal factors, such as 
past trauma, may in many circumstances have a stronger causal role than any underlying 
genetic liability, the pathophysiological level arguably targets variables that are more 
amenable to treatment. Based on this assumption, analysis and explanation at this level may 
therefore be more informative for treatment development and application. 
This approach is consistent with what Kendler (2012) and Schaffner (2008) refer to as 
emergent simplification, where we might hope that a number of etiological pathways 
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converge through a single bottleneck prior to manifesting as mental disorders.  Thus the focal 
level of explanation and classification, physiological dysfunction, would be supported by 
multiple etiological explanations behind that bottleneck.  
The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) provides an excellent example of such an 
approach. In response to the many aforementioned theoretical and evidential questions 
overshadowing psychiatric diagnosis, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
embarked on a new scheme in order to address its strategic goal to “develop, for research 
purposes, new ways of classifying mental disorders based on dimensions of observable 
behaviour and neurobiological measures” (NIMH, 2014). This places RDoC as a framework 
with which to structure and integrate research, rather than as a clinical diagnostic enterprise. 
It is via the RDoC framework that NIMH now funds much research into mental functioning 
and disorder. However in the same way as the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC; Spitzer, 
Endicott & Robbins, 1975) of the 1970’s did, it does have explicit classificatory ambitions 
that also align with other NIMH strategic objectives aimed at improving nosological 
explanatory strength and treatment outcomes. In fact, the RDoC has been framed by its chief 
contributors as an extension of a long-term project to improve psychiatric reliability and 
validity begun by the RDC in the 1970’s (Insel et al., 2010). We may therefore safely 
consider it a placeholder framework that will prove very influential in the formation of future 
psychiatric and psychological nosology. 
In simple terms the RDoC is a matrix to guide research, with each row representing a 
functional domain and each column representing a method, termed a “unit of analysis”, for 
measuring that domain. The five domains include: negative valence systems; positive valence 
systems; cognitive systems; systems for social processes; and arousal/regulatory systems.  
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These domains, and the constructs and sub-constructs within them are dimensional 
and behaviourally described. They can also be considered an endophenotype or intermediate 
phenotype. The negative valence systems domain for example, includes systems involved in 
responses to aversive experiences, and is comprised of constructs responsible for acute threat, 
potential harm, sustained threat, frustrative non-reward and loss. Functioning within this 
domain may be characterised by either an excessively low or excessively high response to 
threat, loss or non-reward. Thus functioning can be quantified as a profile of responses across 
these several constructs, at any point along the constructs’ continua, from low to high. In 
choosing to define the domains in this way, they retain a broad and flexible form, quite unlike 
the narrow categorical criteria of the DSM. However, in choosing to define the domains using 
observable behavioural properties, it does appear the framework is seeking to offer an 
 
Figure 5. Research Domain Criteria matrix. From Cuthbert (2014, p. 30) 
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aggregative explanatory connection between its underlying mechanisms, processes and 
systems (as explicated by methods across various levels of analysis) and observable, 
functional behaviour. 
It is important to remember that these domains are constructs themselves, posited to 
hold together due to the underlying properties and relationships within neural systems. Like 
the DSM diagnostic criteria, these constructs have been defined by groups of experts with 
reference to the evidence, rather than coming directly from specific empirical investigation. 
In fact, analyses that have uncovered patterns amongst multiple mental disorders, such as the 
internalising and externalising factors mentioned prior (Krueger & Markon, 2006; 
Vaidyanathan et al., 2011) have contributed towards the structure of these constructs. Despite 
decisions being based in evidence, and open to iterative revision in light of new evidence, it is 
important to remember that human choice is influencing the shape of this project.  
Although RDoC’s proponents warrant that all levels of analysis affect the biology and 
psychology of mental disorder, the framework’s focal unit of analysis is that of brain circuits. 
This level was chosen based on several assumptions: that mental disorders are brain 
disorders, best characterised as dysfunctional neural circuits; that these circuits can be 
identified using tools from neuroscience such as functional magnetic resonance imaging; and 
that genetics and neuroscience research will eventually enable the use of biomarkers to 
“augment” use of clinical signs and symptoms in diagnostic practice (Insel et al., 2010; 
Morris & Cuthbert, 2012). In short, the RDoC project directs funding to research that will 
assist in identifying pathophysiological mechanisms. Such research searches for tangible 
links between brain circuit constructs and their functional consequences, likely via 
behavioural constructs. In improving the understanding of how brain relates to behaviour, the 
RDoC project seeks to guide a search for various treatment strategies, including molecular 
therapies, neuroplasticity paradigms, and psychosocial treatments (Cuthbert & Insel, 2010). 
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The choice to centre explication, if not explanation, at the level of neural circuits 
aligns the RDoC approach with that of emergent simplification (Kendler, 2012; Schaffner, 
2008), where multiple etiological pathways flow through a bottleneck prior to their ultimate 
presentation as observable mental disorder.  It also bears resemblance to Oulis’ hypothesis 
regarding the process of psychogenesis as the manifestation of (in many cases) complex, 
integrative, multi-level causal processes via pathophysiological mechanisms (2010). Thus 
while it remains pluralistic and open to explanation at many levels, it also assumes that 
mental disorder necessarily operates via neural circuits. The hope appears to be that targeting 
this level of analysis will bring the greatest gains, both in terms of explanatory value and 
treatment efficacy. 
The RDoC matrix specifies cells, molecules and genes as units of analysis that 
respectively descend in stepwise fashion from the bottleneck of neural circuits, and inversely, 
physiology, behaviour, self-reports, and methodological paradigms as progressively 
ascending from neural circuits. For example, within the construct of acute threat/fear, neural 
circuits of interest include parts of the amygdala, prefrontal cortex and autonomic nervous 
system, to name a few. Cells such as neurons and glia; molecules such as dopamine, 
glutamate and cortisol; and the genes which code for these molecules are included within this 
construct in the units of analysis that follow down from the level of neural circuits. Travelling 
up from the neural circuits leads to consideration of physiological responses such as fear 
potentiated startle, skin conductance and heart rate; behaviour such as freezing, response time 
and avoidance; self-reports such as the BAI (Beck Anxiety Inventory) and STAI (State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory); to paradigms such as fear conditioning and viewing aversive pictures or 
films, located at the upper edge of the matrix. In this way the construct of acute threat is 
characterised by an accumulation of theory and evidence across these different methods, 
methods which span biological and psychological fields of interest. 
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In summary, the RDoC matrix, although pluralistic in its attribution of cause, 
conceptualises mental disorder as necessarily flowing through the level of neural circuits 
towards consequential observable manifestation. Thus, while leaving room for higher and 
lower levels of explanation, its concept of mental disorder is nested within the physiological 
level of analysis.  
Although the RDoC project is currently a nascent research engine, it has explicit goals 
to improve classification (Insel et al., 2010). If neural circuits become the primary level at 
which mental disorder is conceptualised, and they are open to identification via biomarkers 
and neuroimaging, then this would imbue classification with the potential to objectively 
identify a dysfunctional mechanism. Under this scheme, the concept of mental disorder aligns 
with the current Harmful Dysfunction analysis.  
Hypothetically, mental disorder may be classified at the level of a higher level 
domain, such as the negative valence system, or at the level of a construct or sub-construct, 
such as the acute threat construct. Functioning may be deemed pathological based on severity 
at either end of the dimension (for example an overactive or underactive acute threat neural 
circuit). Alternatively or additionally, functioning may be deemed pathological based upon 
correlates and causal inferences linking circuit measures to functional impairment via self-
report data and clinical observation. 
An interpretation that emphasises pathophysiological processes would conceptualise 
comorbidity as the resultant effect of two or more dysfunctional neural circuits. Again, these 
circuits may reside within the same general domain or may indicate dysfunctional processes 
across domains (high acute threat comorbid with low approach motivation). Irrespective, 
current comorbidity is viewed as more than a methodological artefact, it is viewed as 
indicative of a need for a paradigm shift in classification specifically, and research 
approaches more generally.  
IMPLICATIONS OF COMORBIDITY          79 
 
 
The success of this model in offering coherent and integrative concepts and 
explanations of comorbidity depends on whether rich and variant etiological pathways are 
shown to causally travel through the level of neural circuits.  If this process of emergent 
simplification is reliably demonstrated then the concept of mental disorder and comorbidity 
nested in neural circuits may offer high value across Kendler’s (2012) multiple explanatory 
criteria (strength, causal role, generalizability, specificity, manipulability and proximity.)  
The issue remains that the level at which mental disorder is best conceptualised 
should not be decided a priori, but instead should be decided upon the basis of empirical 
evidence (Lilienfeld, 2014) and theoretical considerations. While RDoC certainly offers the 
potential for integrative concepts and explanation of mental disorder and comorbidity, in 
choosing to focus concepts of disorder at the neural circuit, its founders are taking a gamble 
on the neural circuit’s causal role. Its strong focus on biological levels of analysis has led to 
claims that risks of reification are high (Berenbaum, 2013), and that the scheme is flawed due 
to its reductive assumptions (McLaren, 2011). 
The RDoC’s founders argue against claims of reification and reductionism by 
referring to the inclusion of levels of analysis such as behaviour and self-report in the matrix.  
Importantly, all of these levels are seen as affecting both the biology and psychology 
of mental illness. With the RDoC approach, independent variables for classification 
might be specified from any of these levels of analysis, with dependent variables 
chosen from one or more other columns. (Insel et al., 2010, p. 749). 
However, the role of levels of analysis such as self-report and behaviour, seems to 
largely focus on a duty to provide a methodological link to the functional effects of neural 
circuits and their biological mechanisms. The causal roles of cognitions, affect and behaviour 
do not appear to be given the same explanatory significance as neural circuits and their 
biological underpinnings. Instead cognitions, affect and behaviour are deemed important as 
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manifest indicators of the functional impact that pathophysiological mechanisms and their 
etiological antecedents cause.  
Even if they are given equal explanatory status, it may be difficult for this model to 
clarify what role feedback processes from higher levels of analysis may have in bringing 
about dysfunction as conceptualised at the neural circuit level. Dynamical methods would 
need to be used to characterise whether causal interactions between circuits and higher-level 
processes are bi-directional. Although this is a possibility, it is certainly not the concept of 
mental disorder emphasised by this model. This also speaks to the model’s medical focus on 
aetiology rather than the concept of maintenance of dysfunction that is prominent in 
psychological theory and treatment approaches. 
Given the current uncertainty regarding the etiological bottleneck role of neural 
circuits, it is difficult to assess this model’s explanatory coherence and integration with 
regards to comorbidity. “Structural and functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have 
suggested a range of central nervous system abnormalities that correlate with mental disorder 
but the specificity and strength of these associations, as well as their causal status, remain 
uncertain” (Kendler, 2012, p.16). Of course the hypothesis that RDoC is following is that the 
reason that specificity and strength of neural correlates is poor, is due to the current incorrect 
parsing of mental disorder on a phenotypic, descriptive basis. At this stage the evidence is 
inconclusive. 
While Lilienfeld (2014) asserted that “RDoC is a calculated gamble that appears to be 
worth the risk” (p.1), he also stressed the need to learn from previous research experience. 
The RDC of the 1970’s led to a paradigm classificatory shift via the DSM-III, a shift that 
resulted in the reification of mental disorder categories. A significant risk associated with this 
model of mental disorder, especially given the fallibility of biological explanation to 
essentialist biases, is that neural circuits will become reified as the cause of disorder. This 
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seems to fly in the face of promising biologically based models of human functioning and 
agency, such as dynamic systems theory and emergent materialism (Christenson & Hooker, 
2000). 
Comorbidity: Artefact or Inherent? 
The latent construct, pathogenetic and pathophysiological models discussed thus far, 
are in line with Aragona’s (2009) call for a paradigm shift in classificatory practices due to 
currently observed hypercomorbidity. They each conceptualise comorbidity as an artefact of 
current classificatory and diagnostic methodology, instead seeking to explain mental disorder 
based on underlying causal processes. However, as demonstrated neither latent construct or 
pathogenetic models of mental disorder are likely to meet the demands for coherent and 
integrative explanation required by comorbidity. Coherent and integrative explanation may be 
possible at the neural circuit level, however this is dependent upon neural circuits acting as a 
causal bottleneck for the development and maintenance of mental disorder. What are the 
alternatives if we are unwilling to take such an a priori gamble? 
 “High rates of comorbidity in psychiatry will not simply disappear once scientists 
develop a better nosological paradigm” (Zachar, 2009, p.14). In contrast to Aragona (2009a), 
Zachar characterised comorbidity as an inevitable consequence of attempts to classify mental 
disorder. He argued that “the phenomena covered by the term ‘comorbidity’ are real, 
expectable features of the psychiatric domain” (p.14). Pointing to the interconnected nature of 
the human brain, its entwined structural and functional architecture, and humans’ dynamic 
and integrative nature of functioning with the external environment, he surmised it unlikely 
that classification based in aetiology will tidy away the problem of comorbidity. Instead, he 
supported a nosological goal to lower comorbidity and provide an improved framework for 
its conceptualisation based in research and evidence.  Zachar’s stance is not anti-realist, but 
pragmatic. In fact perhaps because of his realist perception of human functioning as 
IMPLICATIONS OF COMORBIDITY          82 
 
 
inherently complex, he argued for a nosology commensurate with pragmatic goals rather than 
based in essentialist aspirations towards natural kinds (Kendler et al., 2011; Zachar, 2000, 
2014). 
In response to these assertions, let us consider comorbidity as typified by members of 
a vulnerable population (Zachar 2009) or multimorbid class (Vaidyanathan et al., 2011). 
Individuals in this group experience more severe and more complex manifestation of 
psychopathology. Arguably, it is this group to which our explanatory models and treatment 
evidence should be attuned. It is highly likely that behind such presentations lies a complex 
confluence of causal factors and pathways. Seeking to understand mental disorder or 
comorbidity in all its detail may result in an explanation that lacks clarity or manipulability. 
Perhaps a level of generalisation and idealisation is necessary. Alternatively, strategies to 
simplify causal pathways at one level, for example neural circuits, may fail to capture 
important casual contributors, weaken explanatory depth and coherence, and lead to 
essentialist assumptions and reification. Furthermore, idealisation of models of mental 
disorders that greatly emphasise differential diagnosis over descriptive psychopathology may 
result in decreased applicability of models to complex clinical presentations, as observed in 
the comorbid client. 
It is a possibility that multimorbidity may be relatively etiologically simple, resulting 
from causes at primarily one broad level of explanation. A genomic configuration as indicated 
by an endophenotype may designate clear risk to psychotic processes. Neural circuit analysis 
may indicate dysfunctional neurodevelopment across several domains of functioning. These 
genetic and physiological factors may establish a developmental course in adolescence that 
leads to a wide constellation of disabling symptoms - substance use, anxiety, depression, a 
breakdown in interpersonal relationships and continued psychosis - even within the context of 
a highly supportive environment.  Inversely, a developmental pathway beginning with low 
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genetic and neurodevelopmental liability to mental disorder may be thrown off an adaptive 
course as a result of environmental factors such as exposure to trauma and sexual abuse in 
early adulthood, resulting in a similar constellation of symptoms - substance use, anxiety, 
depression, a breakdown in interpersonal relationships and psychosis.  
Both scenarios, while causally divergent are relatively simple, with cause located 
primarily at either the biological or environmental level. However if effective treatment or 
intervention is required, broad explanation is likely to be insufficient. Analysis across 
multiple levels is needed to understand how micro, molar and macro levels of functioning 
each influence the other. Some levels are likely to have a more central and stronger causal or 
maintaining role than others. 
These examples clearly demonstrate two key implications: 1) No one level of 
explanation is fundamental (Murphy, 2006); 2) Even within individuals with similar 
presentations, causal pathways are likely to vary, and the respective impact of causes at 
different levels is therefore also likely to vary.  Neither of these points is unique to comorbid 
presentations, it is a result of the multifactorial nature of mental disorder. However, 
comorbidity serves to remind us of the likely interactive and variant nature of etiological and 
maintenance processes in mental disorder. Given it is the comorbid population which 
experiences the greatest severity and distress it follows from the implications above that: 1) 
Denoting any level of analysis with explanatory weight a priori to evidence is unjustified and 
potentially harmful; 2) We must embrace concepts and methods that are able to help us 
understand the integrative and variant causal nature of psychopathology; 3) substantive 
theory is indispensable when addressing the issue of comorbidity, alongside responsivity to 
relevant data. 
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Integrative Pluralism 
“Neither its complications nor its chaotic dynamics should scare away the curious, nor 
drive them to replace clear-eyed investigation of the nuanced beauty of complexity with the 
austere, clean lines of the simple and timeless” (Mitchell, 2009, p.11).  
Sandra Mitchell (2008, 2009) championed the adoption of integrative pluralism as an 
epistemological theory to bring us closer to understanding complex scientific challenges: 
“Pluralism in causes, pluralism in ontological levels, and pluralism in integrations will 
characterise the scientific explanation of complex system behaviour” (2009, p. 110). 
Integrative pluralism embraces the use of multiple causal factors, across many levels of 
analysis, to form models that combine in multiple ways to shape explanations of complex 
causal systems. The difference between this approach and one based in emergent 
simplification is obvious. Emergent simplification may embrace pluralism in cause and 
ontological level, but its hopes are vested in avoiding messy integrative explanation by 
demonstration of a causal level through which all etiological processes, travel such as the 
neural circuit. 
The characteristics of mechanisms common to biological systems indicate that 
emergent simplification strategy is unlikely to be successful (Mitchell, 2009). Take for 
example the issue of feedback mechanisms. Feedback mechanisms are observed across 
molecular, behavioural and social levels in a range of biological species, often acting as both 
an upward and downward causative force. While effecting changes in lower level causal 
systems, a feedback mechanism may also bring about self-organisation, homeostasis or chaos 
in higher level behaviour. Similarly, even within the level of the cell, the effect of change in 
one variable (e.g. knockout or mutation of a gene) may be altered by compensatory strategies 
internal to the cell, such as redundancy (a mechanism that utilises ‘spare copies’ of genes to 
ensure a biological process will continue) and degeneracy (compensatory intracellular 
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mechanisms). A network capable of reorganising itself, suggests properties of non-
modularity, non-aggregation and non-linear dynamics (Mitchell, 2009). 
Acceptance of these mechanisms and characteristics as important in biological causal 
systems has implications for our methods, concepts, models and explanations. Each needs to 
adapt to the different levels of contingency and stability that may be present within causal 
networks or systems. How then do we best understand or represent such complex causality? 
One potential tool, network analytic methods, is discussed later. However, while 
technology may offer some assistance, Mitchell (2009) also turned to pragmatism for 
guidance, suggesting that our representations need to be attuned to both the limits of our 
cognitive abilities and our purposes. Firstly, irrespective of their specificity, if models are 
theoretically sound and based in evidence, we may interpret them as accurate ways to map 
relationships and capture the topography of cause and effect in mental disorder. Secondly, the 
decision to adopt models and concepts at either a fine-grain or coarse-grain needs to be based 
on our goals and objectives. Any generalisation or idealisation should take place with this in 
mind.  For example, a classification system may utilise a categorical cut-off despite 
demonstration of an underlying dimensional structure, as such a cut-off may assist in 
allocating resources to those most in need.  
Finally, resultant models and concepts should be interpreted with awareness that such 
strategies may have been employed at least partly in order to help us make sense of inherent 
complexity. Although it may be the goal of scientific realism to represent nature in 
correspondence with the “truth”, Mitchell’s pragmatism highlights the extraordinary 
complexity of the world. An implication of this complexity is that a fully explicated 
understanding of interactions within and between complex systems, even solely within the 
realm of mental disorder, may be beyond our cognitive capacity and research methodology. 
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In response we should attune our enquiries to the goals that matter the most, while at the 
same time remaining aware of our cognitive and methodological shortcomings. 
Reductive, material models of mental disorder often work by explication of 
mechanistic processes across biological levels (circuit to cell to molecule to gene). However, 
models of beliefs, emotions and behaviours may not integrate easily with these mechanistic 
processes. Murphy (2006) argued that a process of decomposition (of behaviour, emotion or 
cognition into its structural or functional parts) and localisation (at the neural circuit level) 
while desirable, may not be possible for all human functioning. For example, we are unlikely 
to find the difference at a material (neural) level between a specific intent for murder and a 
specific intent for self-defence (Campbell, 2008). Nor would it be especially useful to 
understand how some thoughts or actions manifest materially when their meaning is 
relationally, rather than physically bound (Baker, 1999; Campbell, 2008). In this way, by 
cashing-in on already integrated systems and processes, self-report measures that capture 
information at the level of belief and desire, may work as better predictors of behaviour than 
quantification or characterisation of neural processes (Lilienfeld, 2014).  
Denoting cause and effect is often a form of inter-level explanation in itself. 
Mechanistic explanation, for example describes the variant effect of genes at the molecular 
and cellular level. Decomposition and localisation is another integrative strategy, for 
example, describing abilities such as speech (behaviour), as capacities of Wernicke or Broca’s 
areas of the brain (anatomy). Additionally decomposition and localisation can describe 
functional rather than structural components. In these instances localisation tends towards 
characterisation as networks rather than anatomical components (Bechtel, 2012; Pessoa, 
2013). Network models are especially useful for understanding emergent phenomena, where 
methods that sum or aggregate component parts may provide an inadequate characterisation 
of the resulting phenomena (Schaffner, 2008). Network explanatory models are often applied 
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to the brain or cognition. Yet another recent application is a causal symptom network model 
(Borsboom & Cramer, 2013), where symptoms themselves are modelled as forming causal 
structures. Changes in sleep (physiology) may cause changes in mood (affect) and 
concentration (cognition) for example. All of these integrative methods include quantification 
of cause and effect and the ability to track change in relation to time. The inclusion of a 
dynamic dimension or component appears particularly important in developing integrative 
models given the influence of feedback processes on causal systems across time. Thus 
longitudinal research across short and longer time-spans seems imperative.  
Mitchell argued that multiple integrative models, utilising multiple methods, may be 
required to understand mental disorder (2008). The examples above illustrate the availability 
of such methods. Utilising several methods is also consistent with a robust approach that 
combines reduction and reconstruction (Barabási, 2011; Pennington, 2014). With such tools 
at our disposal, the challenge therefore, lies in how best to combine these different inter-level 
explanations into a cohesive integrative model or theory of mental disorders. 
Explaining and integrating cause across multiple levels leads to significant 
complexity. The granularity of these models and concepts should therefore be reflective of 
our objectives (Mitchell, 2008). These might differ according to purpose between primary 
health clinicians, specialists, researchers and public health specialists (Valderas et al., 2009). 
While the biopsychosocial model may be a useful heuristic it is likely too generic. As argued, 
a clear goal is the development and application of successful classification and treatment for 
those who experience the most severe psychopathology, the multimorbid population. This 
requires coherent and integrative concepts and explanations of specific mental disorders and 
their comorbid variants. Exactly what level of detail or scope is required can only be decided 
through iterative investigation. However, one thing is certain, a wide range of research 
methods will need to be employed in order to understand how detailed a useful representation 
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needs to be. Moreover, such methods need to be capable of capturing complex emergent 
properties and non-aggregative, non-modular and dynamic relationships.  
Woodward (2008) argued that, while one level of explanation may be chosen over 
another on an empirical basis, such that it better accounts for an effect, sometimes it may be 
necessary to choose or define variables at a broader level in order to see an effect. Similarly, 
models that are too detailed may lack clarity. This is what Mitchell (2009) referred to in 
emphasising that our models should reflect our cognitive capacities. This pragmatic 
realisation, that the complexity of mental disorder may be beyond our cognitive limitations, 
suggests that advances in modelling technology will play a crucial role in assisting 
classification and diagnosis into the future. 
Thus integrative pluralism forms an epistemological framework for thinking about 
concepts and models of mental disorder. It accepts multiple explanatory levels and multiple 
ways of combining theories across these levels, to develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of the world. At the same time it recognises the need for conceptual and 
explanatory coherence. While remaining open to realist assumptions that our causal 
representations correspond accurately with the nature of the world, it eschews essentialism. 
Instead it is guided by pragmatism: pragmatism to guide decisions regarding what 
explanations are best fit for purpose; and pragmatism in realising that our abilities to discover 
and represent the world as it “truly” is, although perhaps incrementally improving, will likely 
remain limited.  
With the framework offered by Mitchell’s integrative pluralism in mind, two models 
of mental disorder are analysed in the following chapter. The RDoC project, this time 
engendered with a pluralist perspective, is reconceptualised and discussed, followed by 
network models of mental disorder. Again, each is considered in relation to comorbidity’s 
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specific challenges and demands. A brief concluding chapter then summarises the main 
findings of this thesis.  
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Chapter Six - Integrative Models of Mental Disorder   
A Continuum of Causal Structures 
In contrast to Feinstein’s (1970) concept of comorbidity as co-occurring independent 
disease processes, Zachar stated that “comorbidity in psychiatry is a broader concept, 
referring to a variety of conditions that overlap in multiple ways” (2009, p.14).   
Let us return to the idea of a continuum of causal characterisations, from homogeneity 
to heterogeneity. While the continuum acts as a contrastive tool, sharpening the differences 
between concepts of mental disorder, it also enables a less absolutist conceptualisation, 
enabling identification of similarities and points of divergence. A similar approach was used 
by Zachar and Kendler in their analysis of different models of mental disorder (2007).  
This continuum is not one of types of causal factors or symptoms (which is often what 
is meant when mental disorder is described as heterogeneous); the continuum instead 
characterises types of causal interactions, processes, mechanisms and interactions that take 
place in the development and maintenance of a mental disorder. Borrowing Kendler et al.’s 
(2011) concept, it is a continuum of homogeneous to heterogeneous mechanistic property 
clusters. At one end is a concept of mental disorders generated by discrete, homogeneous 
causal networks that lead to clear and distinct syndromes. At the other end, a concept of 
mental disorder as fully reflexive, where causes, networks and effects are so highly integrated 
with each other that it becomes difficult to identify distinct causal pathways and symptom 
clusters. While Aragona’s conceptualisation of mental disorder is more towards the 
homogeneous, Zachar’s exists more towards the heterogeneous end of the continuum.  
Homogeneous causal pathways arguably have the following features: a (relatively) 
small number of causal factors that demonstrate reasonable effect size; a (more) discrete or 
linear causal chain; a causal system that is (more) distinct from other systems; less variance 
in causal process as a result of higher level feedback mechanisms; a quasi step-function or 
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threshold effect that separates mental disorder from normality or other mental disorders more 
clearly; a causal sequence that is less affected by changes in background conditions; a causal 
structure that is relatively stable across time.  
Alternatively, heterogeneous causal pathways are likely to possess the following 
features: many relatively weak causal factors; a complex causal chain that is difficult to 
disentangle from its effect or from other causal systems; a causal chain that is highly nested 
within superordinate causal systems; high variance in response to feedback effects or changes 
in background conditions; no step-change or threshold functions, only small quantitative 
changes; high redundancy and degeneracy; a causal structure that changes quickly across 
time.  
The concept of comorbidity is dependent upon where mental disorder is demonstrated 
to reside along this continuum. If the causal characteristics of mental disorders are mostly 
heterogeneous then comorbidity dissolves into increasingly complex causal clusters. As 
Zachar suggested above, it may be possible that different disorders inhabit different zones on 
the continuum. In this case, the nature of comorbidity will differ depending upon which 
disorders are thought to co-occur at any one time. While both concepts of mental disorder 
leave room for multifactorial cause at any explanatory level, the nature of the causal 
pathways may differ significantly. That is, the way causal factors interact to form a sufficient 
explanation for an observed effect may differ. 
Research Domain Criteria Reconceptualised 
The explanatory potential of the RDoC project resides in its attempt to systematically 
structure explanation and evidence across multiple levels, using numerous methods, spanning 
biological and psychological fields of interest. The RDoC initiative is a social project aiming 
to generate theory and evidence about the nature of human mental functioning.  Despite its 
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risks and shortcomings, it is clear that the intention is to create an inclusive and provisional 
framework to guide coordinated enquiry.  
However, as discussed, one of the risks associated with the RDoC’s current strategy is 
its a priori emphasis on biological explanation and conceptualisation of mental disorder as 
brain disease. Five of the RDoC’s seven chosen levels of analysis are biological. In addition, 
exclusion of higher level explanatory phenomena, such as beliefs and desires (not to mention 
interpersonal functioning) demote the use of self-report measures to a role of linking neural 
circuitry to its proposed functional output (Berenbaum, 2013; Lilienfeld, 2014). The ultimate 
risk, given its role as a central funding source for research, is that due to the dominance of a 
biological evidence base, biological explanations will come to further dominate concepts of 
mental disorder at the cost of investigations into the role of causes at other levels. The risks of 
this are especially high given the financial incentives for development of pharmaceutical 
treatments. Given the history of reification of psychiatric diagnoses and evidence of one of 
the mechanisms by which it happens, psychological essentialism, reification of these 
biological models would certainly follow. 
Pluralism instead denotes multiple explanatory levels with causal relevance. While 
cause and effect across levels of explanation may interact, they also need not be fully 
integrative or reductive in order to be valid. Explanations at different levels may exist at that 
level as characterised by their typical causal processes and interactions. A non-reductive 
account recognises that higher level entities and processes, such as thought or spirituality, 
need not be realised or localised in the material of the brain in order to bestow these levels 
with explanatory significance. Although we may form partially reductive accounts by 
integrating explanations across levels to clarify causal pathways, in doing so, reduction does 
not replace the higher levels of explanation; instead it clarifies the lower levels (Murphy, 
2008). 
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Thus an alternative interpretation of the RDoC framework may denote it with greater 
explanatory potential than currently exists through its strategy of emergent simplification. 
This is reliant upon several conceptual and methodological alterations. Firstly, a truly 
pluralist approach would grant higher ontological levels with an explanatory status equal to 
lower biological levels. In addition, all explanations would be held to similar empirical 
standards in demonstrating scope and stability of effect. For example the measurement error 
or predictive accuracy required from functional magnetic resonance imaging data, would be 
comparable to that required of self-report or behavioural measures (Lilienfeld, 2014). 
A more systematic approach to integrative explanation across levels and disciplines 
would also certainly be beneficial. The RDoC project has the potential to provide a 
methodological and conceptual framework for linking explanations of cause and effect across 
different levels of analysis. In doing so it may become obvious that some mental phenomena 
can be explained in a fairly linear fashion across levels. It is also likely that causal sequences 
in other mental phenomena are more heterogeneous, with risk factors at either lower or 
higher levels mapping less succinctly onto constructs, and feedback effects complicating the 
direction of causation.  
If concepts of mental disorder are based in an understanding of aetiology and 
maintenance processes, the extent to which a causal sequence can be reliably determined to 
result in a set of phenomena becomes central to the conceptualisation of any disorder. This 
will invariably involve iterative attempts to increase the reliability of ways to identify causal 
structures. Hence, there seems little room in the future for absolutist or reified interpretations 
of diagnoses. At this stage the RDoC may assist in bringing together a model that x causal 
processes or risk factors across y levels cohere well enough to be considered part of a causal 
system that together is reliably associated with z effects on functioning. The mapping of 
explanations across levels may not be exact, but if it is attuned to our goals and cognitive 
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abilities, it may be good enough to provide guidance for treatment and understanding of 
mental disorder.  
A concept of mental disorder using this framework would be characterised by 
multiple causes and multiple types of interactions within a relational model that held together 
well enough for the purposes of diagnosis, treatment development and application. In order to 
provide a useful classification function, a causal model would need to explain enough 
variance in effects, and be independent (enough) from other causal systems so to be 
differentiated from other disorders or normality. Different mental disorders or groups of 
disorders might differ according to their most influential causal features.  As suggested 
previously, different mental disorders would likely exist in different zones between 
homogeneous and heterogeneous causal structures. The types of models are therefore likely 
to differ: while some may explicate mechanistic processes sequentially across different 
explanatory levels, some may instead comprise a probabilistic network of factors including 
symptoms, past life events and biological markers.  
Under this conceptual scheme, comorbidity would be indicated by the presence of 
data (for example signs, symptoms, objective observations, self-report and historical 
information) that was best accounted for by more than one causal model. In addition, if the 
RDoC project is successful in offering coherent explanation of the casual processes 
underlying mental disorder then it should bring us closer to offering explanations of how and 
why different mental disorders regularly co-occur.  
This pluralistic approach also offers the greatest opportunity for models to be built 
that adequately meet the desired explanatory criteria (Kendler, 2012). This speaks to the 
generativity of the RDoC project situated within an integrative pluralist epistemological 
framework. While few variables at any level are likely to demonstrate strong effect on their 
own, a comprehensive causal model that includes multiple factors is likely to explain a larger 
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portion of the observed variance. Similarly strong causal confidence may not be 
demonstrated at all levels, but other criteria such as predictive validity of the overall model 
may suffice or prove more useful than high causal confidence at one level of explanation. 
Generalizability may vary across mental disorders depending on the nature of each disorder’s 
causal structure. In fact, perhaps it is this aspect to which models will need to be most acutely 
attuned. For example, although shared genetic or developmental factors may play an 
important early causal role, different environmental conditions or biological factors may 
designate divergent causal pathways. Thus, the generalizability of overall causal models may 
become less important than the need to create models that reliably match etiological 
pathways. This may be especially important for individuals who experience comorbid 
conditions. 
Specificity of any model however relates more to the notion of pathways or systems 
being discriminable enough to be considered separate. In some cases models may be more 
causally homogeneous and specificity relatively high. If, however, it is accepted that some 
disorders are causally heterogeneous, variables that endow manipulability may be prioritised 
for the purpose of treatment and assessment. Proximal variables involved in maintenance 
processes may be highlighted for similar reasons. Specificity, manipulability and proximity 
each directly relate to the ethical goal of delivering better treatments for the comorbid 
population and individuals of which it is composed.  
A Tool for Characterising Complexity and Integration 
Borsboom and Cramer (2013) propose an integrative network model of mental 
disorder rooted not in underlying causes such as a disorder construct, but rather in the causal 
relations existing between symptoms. Network models contain two principle conceptual 
components: nodes and edges. In causal symptom networks, symptoms act as the nodes 
(usually represented by circles) and edges are the lines that connect them. Edges can 
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represent different relationships such as correlations, odds ratios or neuronal connectivity. 
Using a matrix, the distance and strength of connections between nodes can be calculated and 
then visually represented. Techniques have been used to: characterise mental disorder based 
in analysis of the definitions of DSM-IV diagnoses (Borsboom, Cramer, Schmittmann, 
Epskamp, & Waldorp, 2011); model onset and termination of depression using analysis of 
auto recorded emotions (van de Leemput et al., 2014); explain the often seen positive 
correlations that occur between cognitive tasks in intelligence testing as a result of reciprocal 
causation rather than an underlying g factor (Van Der Maas et al., 2006); explain patterns of 
comorbidity seen between MDD and GAD via bridge symptoms (Cramer, Waldorp, van der 
Maas, & Borsboom, 2010); and explore the relationships between autism and OCD 
(Ruzzano, Borsboom, & Geurts, 2014). 
Borsboom & Cramer (2013) state that:  “Using network analysis techniques, such 
systems can be represented, analysed and studied in their full complexity…. It provides a 
middle ground in which disorders exist as systems, rather than as entities” (p.93). The 
network theoretical framework provides a method for building general models of disorders at 
a population level. For example, many individuals’ symptom networks could be compared to 
create more generalised or idealised models. Network analysis also holds potential as a 
clinical tool to analyse the symptom networks of individuals presenting for treatment. 
Coupled with technology such as smartphone apps that enable the collection of time-series 
data, clinicians may in future have the opportunity to visualise and characterise clients’ 
individual symptom networks. As such, new methods of assessment may develop. Borsboom 
and Cramer (2013) claim that network analysis techniques can be used to identify which 
symptoms are most influential in a network.  Thus, assessment utilising these methods may 
offer guidance for prioritising treatment of certain symptoms, while also allowing client and 
clinician to track changes in the network over time. Such highly personalised analysis offers 
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an opportunity to bridge the methodological individual-population gap that has proved 
especially challenging for the effective treatment of comorbid disorders. 
Within these models, symptoms play an integral causal role in the aetiology of what 
may be termed a disorder. In fact, it is the concept of disorder which undergoes significant 
transformation. No longer characterised by common underlying causes, as posited by latent 
constructs, pathogenetic or pathophysiological models, instead, a mental disorder is best 
thought of as a nested causal system. In a symptom network model, “the relation between 
symptoms and disorder becomes one of mereology (a part-whole relation)…” (Borsboom & 
Cramer, 2013, p.96). It is the network itself, which becomes the disorder. This somewhat 
turns the construct of disorder on its head. 
 
Although disorders are likely to have fuzzy rather than clear boundaries, they may 
still be adequately defined on the basis of the properties of the network. It is possible that 
 
Figure 6. “Comorbidity under a network approach. Disorder A consists of bidirectionally 
related symptoms X1 – X5, and disorder B consists of symptoms Y1 – Y5. Symptoms B1 
and B2 are bridge symptoms that overlap between disorders A and B. In this model, 
comorbidity arises as a result of direct relations between the bridge symptoms of two 
disorders.” From Cramer et al. (2010, p. 140) 
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symptoms will display differential connections to one another, and in doing so form symptom 
clusters or communities that share dense connections within the community and fewer 
connections to symptoms outside the community. Indeed, analysis of DSM-IV diagnostic 
definitions revealed this phenomenon, known as small world architecture, demonstrating 
high clustering (short distance between nodes or symptoms) within disorders (Borsboom et 
al., 2011). Similarly, an analysis of NCS-R data (Cramer et al., 2010) suggested that a 
plausible approach to classification using these methods might be choosing to categorise on 
the basis of, for example, the three most central symptoms in an MDD cluster. However, in 
both studies, some communities were also shown to have a high degree of overlap with other 
communities, leading to implications regarding the nature of comorbidity. 
The phenomena of comorbidity currently observed in relation to DSM diagnoses, is 
therefore thought to arise due to the causal relationship between symptoms that bridge 
disorders or communities. The empirical network of MDD and GAD, elucidated in the study 
by Cramer et al., (2010), revealed that comorbidity was more likely caused by a 
unidirectional causal relationship from the MDD to GAD symptoms, potentially via core 
psychological symptoms such as depressed mood and loss of interest. Moreover, symptom 
clusters that indicated presence of both disorders, were more strongly connected in those who 
presented with at least one set of overlapping symptoms. For example, MDD and GAD 
diagnoses share symptoms relating to sleep, fatigue, restlessness and concentration. This 
relationship was not accounted for by the diagnoses sharing these symptoms, rather, the 
clusters of each disorder were much more highly interconnected in individuals who presented 
with these symptoms. The authors, therefore, suggested that it was indeed the causal 
relationships between symptoms that lead to comorbidity in this instance.  
However, symptom communities may be so intertwined that there remains no factual 
basis upon which to segregate disorders. Given this eventuality, disorders may be classified 
IMPLICATIONS OF COMORBIDITY          99 
 
 
solely on the basis of practical consequences (Schmittmann et al., 2013). Whether symptom 
communities or disorders are reliably discriminable from one another, away from the 
structure of DSM diagnoses, remains to be seen. Additionally, it will be interesting to 
discover whether variance in networks between individuals is contained enough to denote 
disorders with typical features. 
At this point it is important to recognise the limitations of this method and its related 
concept of mental disorder. Like other psychometric methods, the resultant model is 
conceptually dependent upon the data from which it is formed. Thus, its validity rests upon 
the decisions made along the way to include or exclude particular symptoms or types of data. 
Similarly, its reliability is dependent upon its ability to adequately measure the data. 
Nonetheless, proponents of these types of models make a strong argument for their 
theoretical strength as a characterisation of the observable features of mental disorder, 
especially in comparison to the theoretical assumptions needed to endorse concepts bound in 
latent constructs (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; Schmittmann et al., 2013; Van Der Maas et al., 
2006). 
Such methods do offer potential for characterising complex systems, are widely used 
across other disciplines for similar purposes, and are especially pertinent in relation to the 
“data explosion” witnessed over the last few years (Barabási, 2011). Already there is 
evidence that mental disorders show characteristics typical of complex networks such as 
critical slowing down or tipping points (van de Leemput et al., 2014), small world 
architecture, and hubs and communities (Borsboom et al., 2011; Cramer et al., 2010).  These 
methods also respond to Mitchell’s (2009) demands for characterisation of bi-directional, 
non-aggregative and dynamic relationships.  
Network analysis techniques are an intriguing tool with obvious potential. However, it 
remains likely that multiple levels of explanation will be required to understand mental 
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disorders (Kendler, 2012). For example, characterisation of mental disorder solely at the 
symptom or descriptive level (even if denoted with causality) does not explain patterns of 
heritability observed in many disorders. While network analysis potentially offers ways of 
identifying which symptoms to target in treatment, by itself it offers little guidance regarding 
how to change or prevent symptoms. As with latent constructs, there is a need to draw on 
other methods to develop resilient theories. 
However, a network approach appears to be a flexible tool that can be utilised across 
different levels of analysis. Borsboom and Cramer (2013) use a metaphor of Russian dolls to 
describe the concept of networks nested within networks across explanatory levels. Symptom 
networks may therefore be nested within higher level social networks. Symptoms, themselves 
nodes in a network of mental disorder, may be described by a network of interactions at lower 
levels.  Sleep problems for example “are complexly structured, with feedback cycles between 
hormones, external cues, and behaviours that give rise to the circadian rhythm” (Borsboom & 
Cramer, 2013, p.104). 
Thus it appears that the explication of mental disorders as complex and integrative 
causal networks or “mechanistic property clusters” (Kendler et al., 2011), is a possibility in 
the foreseeable future. Combining methods used in the RDoC project with network analysis 
techniques will likely foster conceptual and explanatory coherence and integration.  A 
flexible, multidisciplinary, multi-method approach seems essential to such a pursuit. 
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Conclusion 
It has been argued that the adoption of a classification system grounded in causal 
theories and models is probably our best strategy for improving outcomes for those who 
experience mental disorder. This thesis has specifically addressed the pursuit of etiological 
classification in light of the phenomenon of comorbidity. 
Psychiatric comorbidity makes a clear ethical demand: to improve outcomes for those 
who experience multiple mental disorders. Improving outcomes for the comorbid population 
is an important ethical goal because it is these individuals who carry the highest disability and 
distress resulting from psychiatric disorder. Knowledge objectives spring directly from this 
ethical goal – coherent, integrative explanation of mental disorder – for the purpose of 
helping clients make sense of their experiences, to develop effective treatments, and to aid 
clinicians in communication, assessment and treatment. However, another reason to listen to 
the demands of comorbidity has become clear throughout the course of this thesis. The 
phenomenon of comorbidity likely reflects the complexity of mental disorder. Thus, 
comorbidity sets the standard to which our explanatory theories should strive to 
accommodate and our concepts seek to address. 
Acceptance of this complexity does not mean rejection of a realist strategy. It simply 
means more flexibility is required in our concepts, theories and methods of investigation. 
Allen Frances refers to a “humble realism” (Phillips et al., 2012a). In reference to the issues 
discussed in this thesis, this is a realism accompanied by awareness of the massive causal 
complexity that is likely involved in describing and explaining mental disorder. Hence, it is 
sensitive to the limitations of our cognitive capacities and methodologies to map the world as 
it “truly” is. With such awareness, humble realism may form a fruitful partnership with 
pragmatism as a way to sharpen our focus of inquiry to meet our goals. 
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Acceptance of complexity also provides a form of protection against reification. 
History is likely to repeat itself if the current RDoC strategy to prioritise neural circuits is 
maintained. Just as reification of DSM diagnoses took place despite explicit statements 
regarding their atheoretical and descriptive status, so conceptualising mental disorder as brain 
disorder at this level, even with multiple disclaimers that cause at other levels plays an 
important role, will certainly lead to reification of disorder constructs under the RDoC 
project. There is an acute need to remain aware of inherent biases for psychological 
essentialism in this context. Moreover, its emphasis of biological mechanisms will result in a 
significantly larger evidence base in support of biological theories than alternative causal 
explanations. We should therefore eschew such simplification strategies at this time, in favour 
of the potential benefits brought by richer explanations. 
Several strategies may assist in representing complex causal processes. A continuum 
depicting variance in causal structure from homogeneous to heterogeneous provides a useful 
heuristic. Network models also offer potential for analysing and visualising interactions 
between causes, as well as representing integration across different explanatory levels. 
Integrative pluralism is an epistemological framework that not only entertains causes at many 
levels, but is also open to different kinds of integration between causes. Despite this, it may 
ultimately be preferable to choose one level of analysis at which to conceptualise single or 
multiple mental disorders. If so, this choice can be made with open eyes that such a 
simplification strategy reflects a particular purpose. 
The phenomenon of psychiatric comorbidity, therefore, not only drives us to advance 
explanation, concepts, and classification of mental disorder for the purpose of improving 
client and patient outcomes, but also provides methodological and epistemological guidance 
in order to address such a challenge. 
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